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ABSTRACT 
The influence of policy knowledge and public interest upon the policy making 
process is described in this dissertation.  The manner in which major policy change 
takes place, particularly as legislators gain technical understanding of an issue, is 
exhibited through this case study of a national security program.  Specifically, this work 
concludes that steady increases in funding for the nuclear materials detection program 
were reversed as public interest waned and as legislators learned more about the limited 
efficacy of the program.  These findings are consistent with hypotheses derived from 
the application of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and the Issue Attention 
Cycle (IAC).  
The ACF provides a basis for integrating factors external to the bureaucratic 
subsystem into analysis of policymaking processes. The research indicates that 
legislators applied the knowledge they gained through congressional hearings to a 
significant budget-related decision.  At the same time, consistent with IAC, this work 
concludes that the timing of this major budget decision occurred alongside a significant 
decline in public attention.  Combining the two theoretical frameworks, this dissertation 
offers a conclusion regarding how both policy-oriented learning and public issue 
attention influence policy change.  
 This case study is distinct because of the issue’s complexity and the broad 
public interest and bipartisan support it received.  These circumstances led to a context 
that allowed me to consider what makes learning possible as legislators must constantly 
absorb tremendous quantities of information on a variety of topics. The characteristics 
of this case also provided me with the opportunity to develop an analytical schema to 
process complete data sets representing both related newspaper coverage and 
congressional hearings in an objective manner.  
xiv 
This project is an integrative model that shows linkages, indicating that the 
convergence of public issue attention and legislator policy knowledge factors is 
significant enough to account for the major radiation detection equipment policy change 
that took place in 2008 and 2009. Data reveal that radiation detection program budget 
decreases did occur in conjunction with a gradual decline in public attention and 
enhanced Congressional policy-oriented learning, and that broad initial coalition 
support for robust nuclear detection equipment funding eventually shifted to support 
other approaches to deterring nuclear terrorism.  This finding should encourage 
additional research using the ACF and IAC to explain both sources of policy change 
and policy-oriented learning. 
 
Keywords: policy knowledge, policy-oriented learning, Issue Attention Cycle, 
Advocacy Coalition Framework, subsystems, coalitions, stages heuristic, policy core 
beliefs, secondary policy beliefs. 
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PROLOGUE 
“In the optimistic American tradition, [such] a technological solution is initially 
assumed to be possible in the case of nearly every problem.” Anthony Downs, The 
Issue Attention Cycle 
 
** 
 
 “What instrument would you use to detect an atomic bomb hidden somewhere in a 
city?” Oppenheimer quipped, “A screwdriver (to open each and every crate or 
suitcase).” (1946 Senate testimony/Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin) 
	  
	   Anthony Downs (1972) defines phases of public interest in issues of national 
importance with the Issue Attention Cycle (IAC).  In his introductory work, Downs 
applies the IAC to the emerging environmental movement.  In subsequent work, 
Petersen (2009) endorses the IAC’s application to other issues of national interest 
such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Sudden and intense 
public interest, coupled with calls for action define these issues.   As constituents 
assess the magnitude of complex issues and press for solutions, the government 
typically reacts first by bolstering existing technical capabilities and then by 
allocating resources for new alternatives.  Policy actions intended to address new 
and pressing problems typically result in increased resource investments.  
 In matters of defense and national security, the perception that bureaucrats 
are not good stewards of research and development funds persists.  A cynical 
American people and brash media often claim that the government is complicit with 
the waste that results when ostensible solutions do not develop quickly and 
effectively.  This case study addresses public perceptions and Congressional 
knowledge through observations of public attention to major issues and through 
analysis of Congressional decision-making. In particular, this research identifies the 
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manner in which public attention to an issue, alongside increases in Congressional 
knowledge, may influence the timing of policy change.  This research accomplishes 
this objective through analysis of public and Congressional responses to the threat 
of domestic nuclear terrorism in the wake of 9/11. By analyzing the events 
associated with establishment of a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), 
data regarding public trends in interest and Congressional learning inform 
conclusions about the manner in which policy change occurs in this case, and 
develops a context for determining whether the skepticism many Americans feel 
regarding Congressional decisions is properly placed.  
 The initial unqualified support for the GNDA devolved as the challenges 
associated with the tasks of countering the nuclear threat—in terms of complexity 
and cost—became evident.  The objective of the GNDA is to maximize the 
effectiveness of radiation detection equipment installations, intelligence 
information, and law enforcement capabilities through one strategic approach 
against nuclear terrorism.  Unfortunately, GNDA initiatives led by the Department 
of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) did not 
succeed in coalescing the many independent capabilities associated with pre-
existing assets and emergent assets.  Years after initial robust political support and 
significant resource investment, the current detection equipment architecture bears 
little resemblance to its foundational expectations.   
 This study observes that hundreds of millions of dollars in resources 
allocated to the DNDO from 2003-2013 coincide with broad news coverage and 
increasing Congressional activity. The significant funding DHS received for the 
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GNDA came with substantial oversight—subsystem members associated with the 
mission provided testimony before homeland security committees from 2003-2013 
on nearly 70 occasions. GAO expertise, alongside subject matter expert testimony, 
enhanced legislator policy knowledge.  Meanwhile, the public reacted to the threat 
in a manner that clearly demonstrates the phases of the IAC.  This study indicates 
that, at the time of increased legislator policy knowledge and decreased public issue 
attention, funding for DNDO’s radiation detection equipment programs declined. 
 Ultimately, this study contributes to an understanding of what provokes the 
timing of smart and swift policy change.  The research should provide improvement 
to the government’s timing of cost-saving measures, ensuring that policy changes 
are informed by enhanced technical policy knowledge and in line with public 
interest.  The outcome of this study is a conclusion that indicates some cynicism is 
unfounded.  In this case, Congress did appreciate the value of enhanced technical 
information and policy knowledge and will implement policy change in conjunction 
with the public’s desire for it.  Together, the public and Congress should 
acknowledge that investments in both technical and non-technical solutions might 
result in initial failure.  Responsiveness to technical information and an enhanced 
appreciation for issue complexity should lend naturally to Congressional decision 
making processes.  In this case, as public attention to the nuclear threat waned and it 
became clear that radiation detection equipment would not meet initial performance 
expectations.  Congress refined its guidance to DNDO by clarifying its oversight 
purview and providing specific instructions for strategic planning.   
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 A case study of nuclear detection programs is largely unencumbered by 
divisive politics and not easily rendered to the ideological disputes that would 
certainly impact many polarized issue areas such as health care or climate change.  
Nuclear security presents a useful context for policy change research because 
Americans generally agree that something should be done to prevent nuclear 
terrorism. This case is interesting because of its technical nature, i.e. that the 
solution to the policy problem is a technical solution, such as more or better 
equipment (Kim, Y. personal communication, May 11, 2015).  The case of U.S. 
deployment of radiation detection equipment is also an appropriate choice for the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) because DHS and DNDO originated after 
the large-scale exogenous shock; this shock evoked public interest, setting forth an 
opportunity to determine whether considering and charting public attention 
throughout the phases of the IAC is efficacious.  Finally, this case provides an 
opportunity to observe how a government initiative, initially unencumbered 
resource constraints and bolstered with bipartisan support, confronted strategic 
challenges.  
Reasons 
 I began my career in government in 2001 at the Department of Energy’s 
National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE, NNSA).  At DOE, I worked as a 
project manager for export control, and later, radiation detection equipment 
programs.  In 2005, I transferred to DHS, and joined DNDO as a nuclear policy 
specialist.  During my career in these areas, I experienced the great excitement that 
emerged when post-9/11 initiatives were unveiled, and also the disappointment 
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when practical technical matters undermined political and public support for our 
efforts.  I also observed the intense scrutiny and unmitigated pressure personnel in 
these offices endured as we worked tirelessly to develop and deploy the strategic 
vision for our national nuclear detection architecture.  The pressure to perform 
equipment tests with threat materials, identify installation locations that would have 
the most likely chance to interdict threat material, the need to rapidly train 
inspectors and integrate the whole of government users felt like a race against the 
clock.  The significant budget decrement in 2010 undermined morale, but also 
invigorated the efforts to get things right.   
 My perspective allows for both insider and outsider observations. Although I 
left the federal service in 2009, I maintained an interest in radiation detection 
equipment programs and gained perspective on the many dynamics that contribute 
to the nation’s overall approach to national nuclear security.  A case study of this 
particular policy change was therefore fitting for me. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
Statement of Purpose 
 
	   The purpose of this dissertation is to utilize the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF) in conjunction with the Issue Attention Cycle (IAC) to make 
observations about how accumulation of policy knowledge and the cycle of public 
issue attention relate to policy change.  The hypothesis for this study captures the 
influence of these factors upon the budget for the Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office (DNDO). The research hypothesis incorporates budget as a dependent 
variable affected by the issue attention and policy knowledge factors: Radiation 
detection program budget decreases occur in conjunction with a gradual decline in 
public attention and enhanced Congressional policy-oriented learning. 
 Americans consistently report that reduction of the federal budget deficit 
should be a top issue for the President (Gallup: Politics, 2012; Gallup: Politics, 
2016). Terrorism and national security are the other issues that are consistently of 
concern to Americans (Gallup: Politics, 2012) (Gallup: Politics, 2016).  Despite 
these issues of tremendous importance, the government is ultimately constrained by 
the limited resources available after distribution of mandatory funding requirements.  
Herein lies the conundrum—what is the best approach for balancing the expectation 
of fiscal restraint against the allure of finding solutions to the world’s most 
perplexing challenges?  And, in the case of the nuclear threat, how does the public’s 
desire to retain civil liberty balance against the government’s need to screen people 
and cargo for nuclear material?  In order to consider these questions, it is helpful for 
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the scholar to consider first how Congress changes the policy core attributes of 
government programs.  If research reveals an inverse relationship between accrual 
of policy knowledge and decline of public interest, civil servants, subject matter 
experts and auditors may place greater emphasis on delivery of refined policy 
knowledge, particularly at times when constituent interest is most favorable to 
policy change due to waning issue attention.  There are infamous examples of 
government excess, but the occasions in which Congress chooses to make budget 
reductions are often unheralded, and sometimes even greeted with backlash.  
Despite the public’s insistence that deficit reduction is a top priority, its response to 
cutbacks is often unenthusiastic or hypercritical, making the timing of budget 
reductions an important consideration of policy change for legislators.1   
Topic 
 This dissertation used an analysis of domestic radiation detection equipment 
program activities from 2003-2013 to make observations of policy change.  The 
primary subjects of this project were the DHS’s DNDO, legislators of the House and 
Senate Homeland Security Committees, and subsystem members who formed 
coalitions that participated in hearings before those committees from 2003-2013.  
Data drawn from this content was utilized to make observations about 
Congressional accrual of policy knowledge and the timing of policy change 
decision.  The study also includes data drawn from three major newspapers, Google 
Trends, Gallup, and the Lexis-Nexis database.  Data drawn from these sources 
                                                
1 (Montgomery & Goldstein, Democrats Assail Obama's Hit List, 2009) 
(Montgomery, 'Fiscal Cliff' Already Hurting Economy, Report Says, 2012). 
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informs observations about public attention to the issue during the same 2003-2013 
timeframe.  
DNDO enjoyed robust funding and bipartisan support when it was 
established in 2005. Just three years later, in 2008, legislators received discouraging 
reports regarding equipment capabilities.  By 2009, newly-elected U.S. President 
Barack Obama presented his Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 budget, which included a 
proposal for a twenty-percent reduction of the DNDO’s budget. An initial 
impression of this decision indicates a political decision—President Obama was not 
poised to support the program of his predecessor. This conclusion, however, 
undermines the influence of other factors on the policy making process prior to his 
election and the manner in which Congressional learning encouraged this dramatic 
change. The nuclear threat from al-Qaeda was no less significant in 2008 than it was 
previously, but two major changes were in play. First, the public’s attention to the 
nuclear threat issue was in decline. Second, legislators experienced significant 
accrual of policy and technical knowledge related to radiation detection equipment 
performance by 2008-2009. Perhaps these factors contributed to bipartisan support 
of President Obama’s aggressive policy revision and budget package.   
 Using these circumstances to build a case study, this project considers how 
the decision to reduce the FY 2010 budget by decelerating procurements of next-
generation radiation detection equipment might be explained by an ACF policy 
change hypothesis, and particularly how ongoing accumulation of technical 
information and policy knowledge, along with a decline in public attention, may 
serve as an impetus for policy change. The methodology incorporates content 
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analysis to determine how policy knowledge accumulates in Congressional 
hearings, and analyzes the data alongside frequency counts of newspaper headlines 
to measure public issue attention from 2003-2013.  A variety of graphical analyses 
provide insight into the behavior of the two independent variables (legislator policy 
knowledge and public issue attention) over time. When these longitudinal data are 
charted alongside the dependent variable, annual DNDO budget allocations, a 
relationship is inferred. Graphs of policy knowledge and public issue attention 
factors against annual budgets indicate a decline in public issue attention and a 
significant increase in policy knowledge activity in 2008.  This inverse relationship 
may be a contributing factor to the timing of the 2008 DNDO budget decision, 
which became a prominent DNDO policy change during the decade of this study.  
Qualitative analysis highlighted the value of some regression analysis to determine 
if quantitative approaches might enhance understanding of relationships among the 
variables.   
 A variety of theoretical frameworks are available to enhance understanding 
of the policymaking process and, in particular, policy change as it may relate to 
policy knowledge and public issue attention. Throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s, the 
stages approach to the policy making process provided an unambiguous and over-
simplified approach for aligning policy events to policy change effects.  A 
predominant criticism of the stages approach is that it is limited because it fails to 
include the impact exogenous events and other factors outside of the bureaucracy 
have upon policymaker decisions. These inadequacies, among others, provoked 
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dissatisfaction among scholars who incorporated their criticisms into competing 
theoretical frameworks.   
 The ACF, when used in a case study, can inform understanding of policy 
outputs and policy change holistically by incorporating the effects of policy-oriented 
learning and the behavior of advocacy coalitions over time while accounting for 
other factors, such as changes in public issue attention.  Although current ACF 
literature includes hundreds of case studies, few of these incorporate public issue 
attention. The ACF considers public opinion to be an exogenous factor that 
influences the policy subsystem.  The subsystem associated with this case includes a 
range of political and technical coalitions representing a variety of departments. The 
U.S. Departments of Energy, State, Commerce, Defense and Homeland Security 
each participate in these partnerships and also coordinate the provision of technical 
tools and training for the purpose of interdicting nuclear material and weapons.  
Intelligence collection, diplomatic negotiations, and international regimes are also 
among approaches the U.S. and its foreign partners employ to promote nuclear 
security.  Many of these programs pre-date the fall of the Soviet Union, and some 
were in place at the dawn of the U.S. nuclear age.  Over the years, the changing 
global nuclear security environment, improvements in cooperation, and shared 
knowledge shaped the whole-of-government approach that is in place today. 
Additionally, the public’s attention to nuclear security matters plays an important 
role in shaping the manner in which the programs provide national nuclear security 
activities.  
11 
 The IAC is introduced as a tool for observing phases of public attention to a 
topic.  The IAC is complementary to the ACF in terms of providing guidelines for 
applying public attention as an exogenous factor in an ACF policy change 
hypothesis.  As a pair, the IAC and ACF are suitable for exploring whether 
fluctuations in public attention, coupled with ongoing Congressional policy-oriented 
learning, may generate policy change.  This project is an integrative model that 
shows linkages:  Were the convergence of issue attention and policy knowledge 
factors significant enough to create radiation detection equipment policy change?  
Ultimately, this study leverages the ACF and IAC data together to present 
conclusions about the role scientific information may play in nuclear policy change 
by charting the accrual of policy knowledge among legislators and the frequency of 
public issue attention along the course of budgetary decisions.  Media inundated the 
public with detailed and disquieting information about Al Qaeda’s nuclear 
ambitions in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The New York Times published more 
than 14,000 stories about Al-Qaeda from 2003-2012; of these, more than 1,000 
included mention of the organization’s nuclear pursuits. Meanwhile, legislators 
sought options for defending against the countless schemes, plots and worst-case 
scenarios presented to them by their constituents and analysts.   
 Birkland (2004) described how legislators initially and eventually began to 
process information related to terrorism: 
Notwithstanding all the “change” rhetoric in the immediate aftermath of the 
attacks, it is difficult to find much evidence of instrumental learning (that is, 
learning about superior policy instruments) in Congress in the year after 
September 11. Rather, existing organized interests were accommodated, and 
preexisting calls for more stringent policies relating to aviation security, 
intelligence gathering and sharing, and immigration control were voiced, 
12 
with rather greater force in the aftermath of the event but without any 
evidence of new ideas emerging that directly stemmed from the attacks. This 
is entirely consistent with Kingdon's notion of ideas bubbling up and being 
recycled through the “primordial soup” of policy ideas. There is, however, 
reason to believe that social or political learning has followed the attacks—
that the attacks educated all of us about the nature of the terrorism problem, 
and made us better advocates for new solutions. But the volume and urgency 
of post-September 11 law-making were a more a function of the fact of the 
event itself than of any evidence that the event led to lessons about policy 
instruments. Political actors are reacting to the event using the same political 
and policy templates they use for similar events, such as military attacks on 
America, relief after natural disasters, and so on. The need for rapid reaction 
makes learning, in any systematic or ad hoc way, difficult to find. (Birkland, 
"The World Changed Today": Agenda-Setting and Policy Change in the 
Wake of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 2004, pp. 189-90).   
 
The availability of tools such as the IAC for observing public issue attention and 
theories such as the ACF for charting policy change, along with this observation 
from Birkland, (2004) prompted the research hypothesis for this project. The 
meticulous data collection and coding technique developed for this study intends to 
address the challenge of observing learning, and the hypothesis contends that 
systematic learning did take place and did influence policy change decisions in the 
case of the domestic radiation detection equipment program. 
Hypothesis 
  
 The IAC provides a tool for charting public issue attention, which is used in 
lieu of the public opinion factor described in the ACF hypothesis that follows. The 
project utilizes this hypothesis to include a focus upon the “Realizing the Cost of 
Significant Progress” phase of the IAC (Downs, 1972).  Hypothesis Five is one of 
several policy change hypotheses included in the ACF, and indicates that, in 
addition to bureaucratic processes, exogenous factors such as changes in public 
opinion, must be present to instigate policy core change:   
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Hypothesis 5/Policy Change Hypothesis 2 (revised): Significant 
perturbations external to the subsystem (e.g., changes in socioeconomic 
conditions, public opinion, system-wide governing coalitions, or policy 
outputs from other subsystems) are a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of 
change in the policy core attributes of a governmental program. (Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, The Advocacy Coalition Framework, 1999). 
 
By utilizing the IAC to form the following adapted hypothesis, longitudinal 
data related to public issue attention is organized into manageable phases that 
become essential to determining how legislators accumulate policy knowledge.  
This methodology also provided data for developing observations to determine if 
declining public issue attention and increased policy knowledge together relate to 
the policy change.  With this foundation, the following hypothesis emerges: 
Radiation detection program budget decreases occur in conjunction with a 
 gradual decline in public attention and Congressional policy-oriented 
 learning. 
 Through utilization of the ACF and IAC, the study is designed to address 
several research questions related to the accumulation of policy knowledge and 
trends in public issue attention. The following research questions and tasks facilitate 
the collection of data needed to determine how these factors influenced policy 
change, and are formulated with the objective of narrowing a decade’s worth of 
qualitative content into data representing a number of behaviors and influences.   
Research Questions 	  
1. Is there a relationship between Congressional policy knowledge, public 
interest and budget decisions? 
2. Do the timing of increased Congressional policy knowledge and 
declining public interest coincide with decreased budget allocations? 
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3. Do other phenomena anticipated by the IAC and ACF emerge from these 
variables? 
4. Can the IAC be validated as a tool for measuring public issue attention in 
this case? 
Some sub-questions and tasks necessary for informing main research questions: 
• In what years did budget decreases occur? 
• When are Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits released? 
• What comments regarding audits are made during testimonies? (Positive, 
negative, neutral?) 
• Chart elite media coverage of radiation detection equipment as 
evidenced by stories in three major newspapers. 
Summary Observations 
 First, in this case, Congress does reveal increased policy knowledge over 
time.  Correspondent to this learning, major budget decisions are made.  Second, 
Congressional activities coincide with public interest in this national security topic, 
as the hypothesis anticipates.  Also in this case, congressional policy change occurs 
in conjunction with an increase in legislator policy knowledge and a decrease in 
public issue attention.  However, this relationship cannot be isolated as causal. In 
addition, data portray the influence of coalitions, as described by the ACF, and also 
reflect the cycle of public attention as predicted by IAC independently of the 
research hypothesis.  Therefore, in addition to the rejection of the null hypothesis, 
this research indicates exogenous factors such as public issue attention and internal 
factors such as policy knowledge influence policy change in this case study.  The 
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analysis of data collected in the case study independent of hypothesis-related 
analysis provides additional evidence confirming the utility of ACF and IAC when 
considering policy-making factors.  Finally, the IAC does generally reflect public 
issue attention as described by other trending tools. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Theoretical Frameworks and Literature Reviews 
 This chapter describes the Issue Attention Cycle (IAC) and provides further 
evidence regarding its appropriateness for application to this case study in 
conjunction with the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF).  After a brief 
description of the project and the manner in which the IAC and ACF are utilized for 
this project, a brief history of the IAC is followed by a literature review that 
describes the current state of pertinent scholarly work.  Next, is an account of the 
manner in which the ACF emerged as a popular heuristic for political scientists to 
describe the nature of the policy subsystem, and a literature review as it relates 
particularly to both policy change hypotheses and legislative content analysis. 
A case study worthy of contribution to current ACF literature is most robust 
if it can be conducted by incorporating the variety of the factors presented in the 
framework. Longitudinal persistence over a decade or more, the emergence of 
coalitions from the subsystem, and the presence of an exogenous shock are just 
some of the conditions that make a policy event suitable for consideration within the 
ACF.  The activities involved in radiation detection equipment procurements and 
deployments lend naturally to the ACF.  Additionally, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
assert that the ACF is quite suitable for application in technical cases.  Incorporation 
of the concept of public attention to an issue as presented by the Downs IAC allows 
the ACF to benefit from further study and theoretical discourse.  The IAC provides 
a tool for researchers to consider issue attention as an exogenous factor contributing 
to policy change.  This study responds to Mintrom and Vergari’s (1996) criticism of 
17 
the ACF, which suggests that it falls short of explaining when policy change will 
take place.  This case study traces a policy change in which budget cuts occurred as 
public attention waned and Congressional knowledge increased.  The study’s 
observations imply that Congress is responsive to technical information and will 
refine their policy beliefs into decisions.   
 This dissertation utilizes details of the U.S.’s substantial post-9/11 radiation 
detection equipment investments targeted at deterring an act of domestic nuclear 
terrorism to form a case study.  The ensuing project charts the accumulation of 
policy knowledge and trends in public issue attention to determine if these factors 
influenced budget allocations.  These analytical products will contribute to testing 
this dissertation’s hypothesis.   
The Issue Attention Cycle 
 This section will describe the phases of the IAC and explain the manner in 
which the IAC is suitable for making observations regarding public issue attention 
in this particular case.  In Anthony Downs’ (1972) article, “Up and down with 
ecology—the Issue-Attention Cycle” he notes the American public attention rarely 
focuses upon a single domestic issue for longer than a brief moment.  He observes 
public attention as a cycle.  “Each of these problems suddenly leaps into 
prominence, remains there for a short time, and then—though still largely 
unresolved—gradually fades from the center of public attention” (Downs, 1972).  
The phases of the IAC may then be utilized to explain longitudinal changes in 
public issue attention.  The IAC consists of the following five stages: 
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1. The Pre-Problem Stage:  This stage “prevails when some highly undesirable 
social condition exists but has not yet captured much public attention.”  
2. Alarmed Discovery and Euphoric Enthusiasm: “As a result of some 
dramatic series of events or for other reasons, the public suddenly becomes 
both aware of and alarmed about the evils of a particular problem.” 
3. Realizing the cost of significant progress: This stage involves the gradual 
spreading of the realization that the cost of “solving” the problem is very 
high. 
4. Gradual Decline of Intense Public Interest: The previous stage becomes 
imperceptibly transformed into a gradual decline in the intensity of public 
interest in the problem. 5. The Post-Problem Stage: The issue moves into prolonged limbo—a twilight 
realm of lesser attention or spasmodic recurrences of interest (Downs, 1972). 	  	  
 The qualitative historical data collected from hearings and from news items 
reveal the manner in which this issue transpired before the public, and how various 
events indicate these particular phases of the IAC.   
 There are three characteristics Downs observes among the problems that 
typically fall into this cycle.  “First, the majority of persons in society are not 
suffering from the problem as nearly as much as some minority (a numerical 
minority, not necessarily an ethnic one). The likelihood that any particular 
American will directly be the victim of a terrorist attack is very small.  “Looking at 
terrorism over the last 40 years — a period that includes not only the 9/11 attacks 
but also the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City — an American’s chance of perishing 
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at the hands of a terrorist in the United States are one in four million per year. For 
the period since 2001, the chances are one in 110 million.  By contrast, the yearly 
chances an American will die from an automobile accident are one in 8,200, from a 
homicide one in 22,000, and from drowning in a bathtub one in 950,000” (Mueller 
& Stewart, Immense Fear over a Limited Threat to Americans, 2015).  
 Second, sufferings caused by the problem are generated by social 
arrangements that provide significant benefits to a majority or powerful minority of 
the population. Targeted cities such as New York City and Los Angles are massive 
metropolitan areas but are only a small part of the total U.S. population. Al-Qaeda’s 
threats were generally directed at large metropolitan areas. Protecting these cities is 
extremely important and also symbolic, but they alone do not represent the entire 
needs of a secure United States. Powerful and vocal representatives of major 
metropolitan areas seek to secure resources and support for protecting these areas, 
but ultimately, the terrorist threat to these places may create a national economic 
problem, but the threat to the majority of Americans is small.  Nonetheless, in the 
case of the nuclear threat, Americans maintained interest in the government’s efforts 
to implement radiation detection equipment programs through 2008 despite a lack 
of specific information regarding targets or plots in progress.  “Intelligence 
estimates in 2002 held that there were as many as 5,000 al Qaeda terrorists and 
supporters in the United States. However, a secret FBI report in 2005 wistfully 
noted that although the bureau had managed to arrest a few bad guys here and there 
after more than three years of intense and well-funded hunting, it had been unable to 
identify a single true al Qaeda sleeper cell anywhere in the country” (Mueller, Is 
20 
There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy, 2006).  
Interest groups and legislators representing cities with substantial transportation and 
commerce infrastructure aggressively pursued national security resources. The 
media provided opportunities for each of these groups to share their concerns with 
the public through mainstream venues in prime airtime.  
 Third, IAC problems do not have, or no longer have, intrinsically exciting 
qualities.  While the events of 9/11 were shocking and horrifying, public interest 
waned and reporting slowed after several months.  A flurry of dramatic reports 
speculated about the nature of Al Qaeda’s nuclear capability.  Recommendations for 
public safety, awareness, and even descriptions of the symptoms a victim of a 
nuclear or radiological attack would face were described in detail. Then, just as 
quickly as it escalated, positive reporting of radiation detection equipment programs 
declined.  The initial anticipation of DNDO and support for heavy research and 
development investments declined as a full appreciation for the complexity of the 
problem led to less favorable reporting.  Stories describing test beds and promising 
technology were replaced by reports of cost overruns and poor performance trials.  
 The first two phases of the IAC occurred from 1992-2006.  These events are 
described in the following section and provide a background of the case. Later, the 
Analysis Chapter delves into particulars of the IAC as they relate to policy change 
during the 2008-2009 timeframe.  The following overview of the origination of the 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) begins in the Pre-Problem Stage of the 
IAC in 1992 through the Alarmed Discovery and Euphoric Enthusiasm Stage that 
ended in 2006.    
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 The Pre-Problem Stage: Approximately 1992-August 2001. This stage 
“prevails when some highly undesirable social condition exists but has not yet 
captured much public attention” (Downs, 1972).  
 The Pre-Problem Stage of the nuclear threat issue occurred after the fall of 
the Soviet Union.  Security experts were abundantly concerned about the 
implications of post-Soviet military sprawl.  Russia’s initial lack of centralized 
control over nuclear material protection, control, and accountability presented a 
great concern.  In a 1996 Pew Research Center survey, 72% of Americans 
acknowledged a chance that terrorists could use a weapon of mass destruction to 
attack the U.S.  But even the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City a 
year prior did not significantly elevate a belief any terrorist attack was likely:  
• Only 13% worry a great deal about a WMD attack and 27% are 
somewhat worried. 59% profess to be not worried about such dangers.  
• Two out of three (66%) Americans said they are not much or not at all 
worried about terrorism in public places. 
• 49% believe the greatest terrorist threat to the country comes from inside 
the country, while 39% see it originating outside (Pew Research Center, 
1996). 
 
 After the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the U.S. developed strategic objectives 
and policies intended to improve global nuclear security.  In collaboration with their 
Russian counterparts, the U.S. and its nuclear scientific community established 
programs designed to mutually improve nuclear materials protection, control and 
accountability.  One such cooperative program began in the mid-1990s, when the  
Defense and State Departments (DOD, DOS) provided fixed and handheld radiation 
detection equipment to international partners.  By 1994, the Energy Department 
joined Defense and State to increase the breadth of such nonproliferation efforts, 
22 
which became a hallmark of post-Cold War cooperation with the states of the 
Former Soviet Union (FSU).  All of these efforts were considered imperative, as the 
detonation of a single nuclear weapon could bring catastrophic devastation.  
 U.S. Senators Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Sam Nunn (D-GA) served as 
legislative champions and nonproliferation advocates for these programs in 
Washington.  These men were the early architects of many of the USG’s initial 
efforts to integrate the DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) initiatives with 
outreach efforts to the FSU.  Nunn-Lugar legislation encouraged a comprehensive 
approach to counter nuclear threats emanating from the FSU.  In addition to the 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities based at outposts in Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine also retained sizeable nuclear arsenals for several years 
after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R.  The CTR programs offered multi-point 
activity, intending to address the entirety of the post-Soviet nuclear complex, 
ranging from its submarine fleet to its research reactors.  CTR helped define and 
encourage export control processes, and other initiatives such as tailored physical 
and material security improvements, repurposing of equipment, and a shift of 
defense personnel to non-defense applications were a part of its comprehensive 
international mandate.   
 In addition to these efforts, programs were also directed at the intercept of 
suspect radioactive cargoes, including warheads or caches of Special Nuclear  
Material (SNM). Worldwide, the U.S. also provided material storage facilities with 
physical security reinforcements such as fences, locks and surveillance systems.  
Such upgrades were intended to discourage the movement of weapons or material, 
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and also promote a culture of accountability among professional staff.  If material 
successfully moved beyond the facility, radiation detection systems are placed at 
key transit points to assist border security personnel with searches and seizures.  As 
a result of the Nunn-Lugar CTR legislation, the U.S. provided personal radiation 
detectors, radioisotope identifiers, man-portable detection equipment, and radiation 
portal monitors.  American companies produced many of the systems, but domestic 
installations were never pursued, and the U.S. focused only on international 
deployments. DOS partnered with more than 20 countries to install systems at 
nuclear storage sites and key border crossings along potential nuclear smuggling 
routes originating out of the FSU. The collapse of the U.S.S.R. created instability 
and greater opportunities for non-state actor access to nuclear materials, technology 
and knowledgeable personnel.  In 1992, two employees of the State Research 
Institute, Scientific Production Association (“Luch”) in Russia smuggled small 
quantities of Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) over a 5-month period.  A chemical 
engineer associate, who was a long-time employee at Luch, ultimately collected 
1.5kg of material.  The engineer had no buyer, but kept the material at his 
apartment.  When police suspected him of stealing equipment from Luch, they 
arrested him and discovered the material.  The first successful interdiction of 
weapons-usable nuclear material was reported later in 1992, and other instances 
followed across Europe, in Germany, Bulgaria, and Georgia.  Equipment is credited 
with initiating only one nuclear material interdiction among the 19 cases reported 
from 1992-2001, but was nonetheless a central part of the U.S. efforts to counter 
24 
illicit nuclear material movements from post-Soviet military industrial complexes 
(See Appendix Four, WUNM Seizures) 
 Use of equipment for secondary inspection and isotope confirmation post-
seizure is common in the majority of interdiction cases.  When available, customs, 
police, or in-country radiation safety personnel are able to confirm the presence of 
radioactivity and were sometimes able to make isotope identification.  Despite the 
periphery role detection equipment played in these historical cases, investment in 
international equipment deployments remained a hallmark of U.S. nonproliferation 
strategy from 1994-2001.  Smaller initiatives rounded out the strategy by 
incorporating search and seizure training, export control processes, physical security 
measures and staff professionalization into bilateral assistance packages and 
international workshops.  Equipment-centric programs received generous funding 
through DOD’s CTR program office and also through smaller initiatives managed 
by State, U.S. Customs Service (Customs) and Commerce.  DOE’s autonomous 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) leveraged its management role 
and long-standing partnerships with the national laboratories to support technical 
requirements and is responsible for the bulk of international equipment 
deployments.   
 Yet, this strategy was predominately focused upon rectifying security in the 
Former Soviet States, particularly with regard to material and weapons physical 
security.  Equipment deployments and installation locations were generally intended 
to keep materials within confines of the Former Soviet States, to be intercepted by 
the Customs and Border Patrol officials of countries like Kazakhstan and 
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Lithuania—such countries were selected to receive equipment training and 
education provided by U.S. officials. 
 In the Pre-Problem Stage, U.S. officials did not yet appreciate the 
authenticity of the commitment Al-Qaeda had to real destruction of the United 
States. Cooperation with international partners beyond the FSU did not occur until 
after 9/1l, as intelligence indicators were compiled and reviewed to portray the 
whole grim picture.  Then, the increased intensity of domestic and international 
attacks on Americans revealed Al-Qaeda’s willingness to engage in highly 
unconventional attacks with no regard for collateral damage.  Furthermore, their 
brazenness sparked concern that they might pursue a WMD capability that would 
cause mass casualties and incite worldwide panic.  “As was revealed at the trial that 
took place in New York earlier this year [1993], a former member of Bin Laden’s 
Al-Qaeda network began working with the United States government in 1996. That 
witness revealed that Bin Laden had a terrorist group, Al-Qaeda, which had 
privately declared war on America and was operating both on its own and as an 
umbrella for other terrorist groups. The witness2 revealed that Al-Qaeda had a close 
working relationship with the aforementioned Egyptian terrorist group known as 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The witness recounted that Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda were 
seeking to obtain nuclear and chemical weapons and that the organization engaged 
in sophisticated training” (U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2001).   
 Likewise, “By 1992, Al-Qaeda was already dabbling in the nuclear black 
market. Undaunted by a series of scams by hustlers and con men, Bin Laden and 
                                                
2 Jamal Ahmad Al-Fadl was the witness in the 2001 federal trial. 
26 
Zawahiri remained alert to opportunities to buy, steal, or build a bomb. After al-
Qaeda was expelled from Sudan in 1994, Ayman Zawahiri mysteriously dropped 
out of sight. For two years, the Egyptian doctor and two of his top lieutenants 
traveled extensively to Russia, Yemen, Malaysia, Singapore and China. The purpose 
of their travels has never been established, but Zawahiri’s associations during his 
travels, and own statements suggest that he and his cohorts may have been hunting 
for WMD” (Wright, 2002). Zawahiri’s activities, and Osama bin Laden’s 1998 
fatwa compounded USG concern regarding the possibility of an Al-Qaeda-backed 
nuclear attack.  Bin Laden said:  
(On that basis,) and in compliance with God’s order, we issue the following 
fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—
civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it 
in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa 
Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their 
armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten 
any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, “and 
fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,” and “fight them 
until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and 
faith in God” (Bin Laden, 1998).   
 
 The fatwa drew international attention to Al-Qaeda for two very important 
reasons.  First, Bin Laden established himself as the leader of Al-Qaeda in this 
fatwa.  Second, he then used that leadership position to endorse the killing of 
Americans.  The 9/11 Commission Report described another scheme: 
Business aides received word that a Sudanese military officer who had been 
a member of the previous government cabinet was offering to sell weapons-
grade uranium.  After a number of contacts were made through 
intermediaries, the officer set the price at $1.5 million, which did not deter 
Bin Laden….But while the effort failed, it shows what Bin Laden and his 
associates hoped to do.  One of the Al-Qaeda representatives explained his 
mission: “it’s easy to kill more people with uranium” (National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). 
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 Al Qaeda’s rumored pursuits of a nuclear capability were difficult to 
substantiate. Al Qaeda pronouncements and its leadership’s travels only provided 
evidence of the intent to procure a nuclear weapon—the U.S. never confirmed 
warhead possession.   
 The historical review provided in this section now shifts to the next two 
phases of the IAC, which introduce a period of intense public and Congressional 
scrutiny alongside Congressional activities that encouraged accountability and 
understanding of the complexity and magnitude of the nuclear threat. 
Alarmed Discovery and Euphoric Enthusiasm: September 11, 2001-2006 
  Despite the undesirable state of affairs presented by the post-Soviet Union, 
the American public remained generally indifferent to the prospect of domestic 
nuclear terrorism. The events of 9/11 moved the issue abruptly to the alarmed 
discovery phase of the IAC.  Americans expressed intense concern about the 
possibility of nuclear terrorist attacks and mainstream media quickly saturated with 
terrorism coverage.  Over time, a clearer picture emerged as elite understanding of 
technological solutions and deployment costs were recognized as limiting factors for 
detection equipment deployment plans.  
 Prior to 9/11, the U.S. national defense strategy against a nuclear attack 
presumed a state actor.  Al Qaeda’s attacks changed that, and the comfortable 
routine that marked the U.S.’s post-Cold War cooperation with Russia was no 
longer suitable for meeting the immediate demands that emerged from terrorist 
organizations.  The American public suddenly became keenly aware of 
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shortcomings in domestic defense strategy and the nuclear threat was suddenly 
reframed into the context of a state or non-state actor as the perpetrator.   
 The 9/11 attacks greatly intensified interest in previous and ongoing reports 
from U.S. and international intelligence indicating that Al-Qaeda sought a nuclear 
capability.  The legitimacy of the Al-Qaeda nuclear threat is important to explicate 
because national security (i.e., defense against an Al-Qaeda nuclear attack) is at the 
center of the deep core beliefs shared by subsystem members.  Identification and 
observation of deep core beliefs are a necessary component of any research design 
utilizing the ACF.  It is politically advantageous for American politicians to support 
U.S. national security interests, and this lends to the use of characterizing the 
support of it as a deep core belief. 
 Opinions regarding nonproliferation and border security programs coalesced 
after the terrorist attacks.  Representatives sought to support programs dedicated to 
increasing national defenses to counter the nuclear threat.  In a recurring USA 
Today/Gallup poll, 85 percent of Americans surveyed after 9/11 indicated additional 
terrorist acts might occur in the following weeks.  More than two years passed 
before the perception of terrorism as an urgent threat subsided as a majority opinion.  
However, by mid-2003 and through 2011, roughly 40 percent of Americans still 
held the view that another attack was imminent (USA Today/ Gallup, 2011). This 
elevated constituency interest, coupled with tremendous costs associated with 
failing to prevent nuclear terrorism, kept Congress and the Executive Branch 
actively engaged. DOE, DOS and DOD, who each had pre-9/11 missions associated 
with the development of equipment that could intercept nuclear material, responded 
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to a multitude of Congressional requests for information about existing capabilities 
and expectations for future deployments.  Darren Davis (2007) observed that 
Americans first reacted with overwhelming support for domestic security 
enhancements. Petersen (2009) explained some utility of the IAC is because it 
accounted for this expected reaction from the public by explaining that 
policymakers seek simple solutions, and that public supported such solutions.  
Petersen (2009) also indicated that media fail to provide meaningful coverage of 
intractable issues such as international terrorism because of these behaviors.  Data 
compiled for this study exhibit a similarity with the data compiled by Li and Izzard 
(2003), which suggested the media reaction to the 9/11 attacks with deference and 
compliance as the government mobilized assets in response to terrorism (Davis, 
Negative Liberty: Public Opinon and the Terrorist Attacks on America, 2007). 
 On the heels of the attacks, government officials assembled details of each 
existing asset that could contribute to national defense against terrorism, with a 
particular focus upon capabilities that could enhance security without significant 
investments of time.  In this case, the rapid deployment of commercially available 
radiation detection equipment provided the first simple tool for establishing a 
national nuclear interdiction capability. Public and private entities began installing 
radiation detection equipment for health and safety purposes at nuclear facilities 
long before 9/11. Using these installations as a basis for a domestic strategy, the 
U.S. initiated deployments of current-generation detection systems and undertook 
research and development projects as well as next-generation, transformational 
research & development initiatives.  Seeking to avoid escalated attacks and 
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ameliorate public concern, lawmakers perked to the idea of leveraging the existing 
detection technologies at U.S. borders. On September 18, 2001, Congress passed the 
“2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and 
Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, 107-38”.  This legislation 
provided funding for a variety of programs, including those related transportation 
security measures, such as detection equipment.  Commitments to a national nuclear 
detection architecture shifted private sector production to security, rather than 
safety-focused detection equipment.  Prior to the emergence of a domestic market, 
detection equipment companies produced small personal radiation detection devices 
sometimes called “pagers” for use by nuclear science professionals.  These 
companies also produced the early generation “portal monitors” that were procured 
by DOE and DOD for deployment at nearly 70 sites across the FSU.  These systems 
used plastic scintillator technology designed to alert the presence of gamma or 
neutrons.  Although deployed at international cargo points of entry (POE) and at 
pedestrian crossings, false alarms sounded frequently and they often failed to alert 
in the presence of shielded nuclear material. Although it was a well-known 
conundrum that detection of weapons usable nuclear material such as HEU 
presented significant physics and engineering problems, many in the industry 
believed that an aggressive rush of investment would lead to solutions. For several 
years after this Emergency Supplemental, Congress continued to fund detection 
equipment at each of the managing departments.   
 By 2002, more than 4,200 Customs agents carried Personal Radiation 
Detectors (PRD’s). Customs requested 4,000 more PRD’s and 400 pedestrian and 
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vehicle radiation detection portal monitors in their fiscal year 2003 request (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2002).  This request indicated early support of 
an equipment-based approach to the nuclear threat but created fiscal and manpower 
demands among the law enforcement and port security sectors. In the midst of these 
concerns, Ms. Gary L. Jones, Director Natural Resources and Environment at the 
GAO indicated that while these efforts played an important role in the national 
strategy, countering the nuclear threat would require a more aggressive and coherent 
approach with regard to manpower and equipment: 
Our observations concerning the acquisition of radiation detection 
equipment have not changed from what we reported to you in August 
[2002]. Specifically, the Customs Service’s primary radiation detection 
equipment—radiation pagers—have certain limitations and may be 
inappropriate for the task. Further, we remain concerned that no 
comprehensive plan is in place for installing and using radiation detection 
equipment at all U.S. border crossings and ports of entry.  …  
Based on our work with Customs and DOE officials and our review of U.S. 
efforts to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling, we have concerns 
that Customs has not yet deployed the best available technologies for 
detecting radioactive and nuclear materials at U.S. border crossings and 
ports of entry. (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2002) 
 
 The pressure to enhance the state-of-the-art escalated.  Beliefs that additional 
Research and Development (R&D) investments would lead to improvements in 
spectra collection, reduction of threat material false-positives, and decreases in per-
unit costs were widely held at this time. Substantial programmatic and fiscal 
resources were directed at countering the threat of nuclear terrorism.  Meanwhile, 
Congress heard concerns such as those articulated by Ms. Jones and many more 
revealed by additional GAO reports.  The DHS was established in 2003, and by 
2004, the 9/11 Commission Report called for 100% scanning of U.S.-bound cargo at 
major domestic and international POE’s by 2012  (National Commission on 
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Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Several years after 9/11, the state 
of the art for nuclear detection equipment used either radiography or advanced 
spectroscopy, but neither provided the rapid, accurate and affordable platform 
desired for high-volume scans and resolution at busy U.S. POE.  Spectroscopy 
systems were purchased for test-bed installations at a cost of more than $200,000 
each, and their practicality in terms of handheld and transshipment inspections 
received mixed reviews. Transportation security managers expressed concern about 
adding interdiction and safety protocols for nuclear, chemical and biological WMD 
to the existing portfolios of front-line officers.  Practical matters also influenced 
deployments.  Inspectors requested revised specifications for more ergonomic 
equipment, reporting that the weight, handle placement, and docking were 
cumbersome.  Fixed-lane detectors required full-time manning, so officers were 
shifted from other duties to mitigate each alarm.  These challenges, along with the 
existing mission burdens assumed by the various departments, compelled some 
agencies to reconsider their programs and others to adjust their expectations. 
Despite the availability of other potential defenses and deterrents against nuclear 
terrorism threats, the U.S. remained committed to a GNDA at nearly any cost, and 
began incorporating pre-existing nuclear detection installations.   
 Lacking a single coordinator for nuclear detection equipment and response, 
the Executive Branch had no point of contact to provide oversight of domestic anti-
nuclear terrorism projects. So, in 2005, the DNDO received tasking to lead the 
domestic detection enterprise. 
DNDO is the primary entity in the U.S. government for implementing 
domestic nuclear detection efforts for a managed and coordinated response 
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to radiological and nuclear threats, as well as integration of federal nuclear 
forensics programs.  Additionally, DNDO is charged with coordinating the 
development of the global nuclear detection and reporting architecture, with 
partners from federal, state, local, and international governments and the 
private sector (The Department of Homeland Security, 2015).  
 
The President and Congress expected DNDO to take the lead, and billions followed 
(see Table 1, DNDO Budget Authority in Millions, USD). Millions of dollars in 
funding for purchase of additional basic Personal Radiation Detection (PRD) 
equipment and research and development investments in next-generation 
technology. From 2003-2009, the budget increased nearly 70 percent. 
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Table 1 
DNDO Budget Authority in Millions, USD 
 
FY 2005 123 
FY 2006 315 
FY 2007 481 
FY 2008 485 
FY 2009 514 
FY 2010 384 
FY 2011 342 
FY 2012 290 
FY 2013 290 
FY 2014 291 
 
Source: (The Department of Homeland Security, 2014). 
 
 DNDO’s mission extends to international initiatives with national security 
implications. The DNDO organizational structure included procurement groups in 
the Research & Development and Transformational-Research & Development 
arenas. Adaptation of the strategy beyond international partnerships to begin 
deployments of basic radiation detection equipment within the continental United 
States (CONUS) became a cornerstone of the post-9/11 domestic response to the 
nuclear threat. New federal personnel were hired to manage the deployments of 
commercially available equipment and to oversee the research and development of 
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next-generation capabilities that might be suitable for rapid cargo scanning or 
passive, discreet inspection.  
 Detection equipment deployments enjoyed broad bipartisan support from 
2001 through 2008, receiving hearty substantial budget increases during this time.  
The significant investments associated with detection equipment deployments 
indicated broad national support for nuclear security programs.  Although detection 
equipment became a popular answer to the nuclear threat question, equipment critics 
cautioned against the perception of it serving as a silver bullet, reinforcing the 
importance of human intelligence operations overseas and the training and 
education law enforcement officers domestically.  The support for a multi-front 
approach to interdiction is primarily because the equipment is limited in several 
ways.  Detection equipment initially assisted with personnel safety by detecting and 
measuring radiation emissions at nuclear sites. When the national security mission 
emerged, private companies and the national laboratories sought to develop 
alternate platforms and designs for national security applications. However, 
equipment is simply a tool, and without advance information regarding networks 
and their shipments, law enforcement and intelligence personnel were unlikely to 
preemptively identify a single threat container amongst the millions flowing through 
streams of commerce each day.  Detection equipment installations rely heavily on 
the accuracy of the stochastic model used by the USG to determine site locations.3  
                                                
3“The interdictor’s goal is to minimize the probability the smuggler evades detection. The 
performance of the detection equipment depends on the material being sensed, geometric attenuation, 
shielding, cargo and container type, background, time allotted for sensing and a number of other 
factors. Using a stochastic radiation transport code (MCNPX), we estimate detection probabilities for 
a specific set of such parameters, and inform the interdiction model with these estimates.” For a full 
description of the U.S. stochastic approach to interdiction see, (Dimitrov, et al., 2009). 
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This approach to deployment is greatly enhanced by continuous updating of the 
factors that populate the model.  DNDO endeavored to provide a holistic approach 
to deployments and includes detailees from federal law enforcement (FBI, Customs) 
and other departments with nuclear security missions (DOE, DOD)—but funding 
for alternate approaches to interdiction such as specialized training for customs and 
border control personnel, targeted human intelligence (HUMINT) operations, site 
security and export control regimes did not always receive support commensurate 
with the additional demands imposed by equipment installations. 
 The initial excitement surrounding the promise of detection equipment 
programs soon shifted, as public interest waned and the significant hurdles 
associated with successfully deploying a GNDA became entirely apparent.  The data 
representing these events set the conditions that led to the policy change expected 
by the research hypothesis.  Analysis of findings related to the next phases of the 
IAC are described in Chapter Four. 
     John Mueller’s (2006) book described the manner in which the U.S. 
responded overwhelmingly to the 9/11 attacks, and believes that much, if not most 
of the money and effort spent on counterterrorism since 2001 is wasted (Mueller, 
Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security 
Threats, and Why We Believe Them, 2006, p. 5).  Mueller also noted the low-tech 
approach Al Qaeda employed in the 9/11 attack, and stated that while the likelihood 
of such an attack is low, and if it did occur, Americans could recover from it.  
However, he also indicated that the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons 
warrants some policy responses (Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the 
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Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them, 
2006, p. 15). 
 The public’s fascination and concern with the nuclear threat prevailed over 
the option of taking no significant actions in the years that followed the 9/11 attacks.  
Determining the manner in which the events of this case lend themselves to the IAC 
and progress through the cycle is an important component of the project.  Content 
analyses of the news items and historical context gleaned from the Congressional 
Hearings shape the understanding of the events throughout the decade and how they 
reflect the phases of the IAC.  Later, in the Analysis Chapter, the historical events 
are incorporated into the IAC by describing the context and specific events that 
occurred; anecdotal evidence is provided to support the assignment to each of the 
five phases.   
 Next, the IAC literature review describes how Birkland (2004) conducted a 
case study of the 9/11 terrorist events and the manner in which the IAC aptly 
aligned events to each phase, validating the efficacy of the cycle. 
The Issue Attention Cycle: Literature Review 	  
 Since its initial presentation in 1972, Downs’ model has provided context for 
a variety of case studies.  Robert Entman (2003) described the relationship between 
public opinion and policy as ‘cascading network activation’; Birkland (2004) argued 
that policy agenda setting is a process, and that often the media influence perception 
of what is most important on any given day (Petersen, 2009).  Anthony Downs’ 
approach is set apart from these.  Like Entman and Birkland’s approaches to public 
opinion and policy, the IAC enables a description of phenomena surrounding issues 
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of “crucial importance to society” by considering media, but does so with a model 
that indicates it is the public, not elite media, whose reaction to events determines 
media coverage (Downs, 1972, p. 38).  Versions of this proposition exist and there 
is no consensus about who drives issues to the pinnacle of public attention.  Jenkins-
Smith and co-author Kuhika Gupta (2014) critically reviewed the IAC over the 
years and made the following observation:   
In other words, media attention is an important driver of public attention, but 
there is a feedback loop wherein public attention (or lack thereof) guides 
media attention. With respect to the latter, Downs argued that public 
attention orients governmental action by putting pressure on elected officials 
to “do something” about issues that have gone from dormant to highly 
salient in the minds of the American public. If and when the government 
attempts to do something, however, the public will realize that the problem 
is complicated and costly to solve. Thus, public attention drives government 
attention, but (again) there is a feedback loop wherein government attention 
may cause disillusion and ultimately a decline in public attention (Gupta & 
Jenkins-Smith, 2014, pp. 318-319).  
 
 Domestic security became a crucially important issue to society after the 
9/11 attacks.  The use of newspaper headlines to measure public interest and then 
chart the issue through the IAC reveal how the public responded prior to, and 
throughout, the government’s policymaking process. This assertion is fundamental 
to the selection of headline counts as the public interest variable for this study.   
 Birkland’s 2004 article used the IAC to trace the issues of 9/11 and 
international terrorism broadly.  His evidence concluded that, as a topic, media 
coverage declined enough from 2001 to 2002 to move international terrorism 
attention from Stage 3 to Stage 4 (Birkland, The World Changed Today: Agenda-
Setting and Policy change in the Wake of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 
2004).  Petersen’s (2009) article indicated that the issue of international terrorism 
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will ceaselessly cycle through Downs’ model due to a lack of deeper public 
understanding of core international relations issue.  Referring to Downs’ initial 
research, Petersen (2009) indicated that the public became personally connected to 
the global warming issue.  This connection translated to greater support of pro-
environmental policies.  “While education about environmental issues has begun to 
shift public interest, and possibly, public policy, we cannot assume a similar 
trajectory with response to international terrorism or other key foreign policy issues. 
Only if sustained public attention to the issue leads to more depth of understanding 
can we expect he public to push for more nuanced (even more costly) policies to 
address the issue of international terrorism” (Petersen, 2009, p. 13).   
 Perhaps this is the case with the issue of nuclear terrorism.  A nuclear 
weapon detonation promises to be the most traumatic and catastrophic attack type 
available to terrorists. The nuclear threat spans all demographics, and in a general 
sense, everyone fears a detonation and desires to proactively develop measures to 
counter it. This research traces the issue of radiation detection equipment through 
the IAC, and reveals details about the American public’s interest in nuclear threat 
and any relationship to the USG’s response to it. 
 The following section provides a review of the ACF’s theoretical framework 
and literature pertinent to this case. The literature review specifically addresses 
studies that incorporate Congressional hearing content and the policy knowledge 
factor as well as subsystem behaviors.  
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The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
 	  
 The ACF contributes to modern understanding of the policymaking process, 
but it is pre-dated by top-down approaches to policymaking.  Many students of 
political science use this classic approach to chart initiatives through the policy 
making process.  The stages heuristic enables scholars extricate bureaucratic 
activities into distinct phases.  The simplicity of the stages approach is highly 
appealing because it is easy to teach, applicable, and adaptable across many forms 
of government.  Yet its explanatory power is undermined by these strengths, as it 
fails to address and incorporate the influence of additional variables evidenced as 
important over the past decades such as shocks exogenous to the policy subsystem, 
interest groups, and competing priorities. 
 In the mid-1970s, Hugh Heclo claimed that the stages heuristic inadequately 
described certain phenomena he witnessed in policymaking realms, particularly the 
influence of actors who were a part of issue networks but wielded no legislative 
powers.  Although Heclo (1974) did not discount the existence of an “Iron Triangle”  
comprised of executive bureaus, congressional committees and interest groups, he 
did write about the limited explanatory power that the paradigm offers when related 
to different policymaking settings. “Looking for the closed triangles of control, we 
tend to miss the fairly open networks of people that increasingly impinge upon 
government.” His alternate approach extended beyond outputs and decisions to 
“appreciate better the political process and its relationship to the collective social 
choices embedded in public policy” (Heclo, 1974).   
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 Heclo sought to interest scholars of all types in a comparative approach to 
policy and program formulation. Heclo highlighted the influence of factors 
exogenous to the government in his heuristic, asserting that policy development 
occurred not only within the structure of bureaucracy, but as a result of influences 
beyond it.  “Rather than trying to discover a comprehensive theory (of social 
causation or the ultimate sources of modern social policy), I shall look at proximate 
sources and causes.  How have issues of social policy arisen; where have the 
substantive ideas about what to do come from; what is the process by which they 
have been politically accepted and changed through time—in short, how have 
governments come to do the specific things they do” (Heclo, 1974)?  Heclo said that 
case studies of electoral processes, interest groups, internal workings of 
government, and socioeconomic changes (or in a broad sense, external factors) may 
be insightful, but such focused, empirical study would more likely generate 
questions than answers.  He sought to approach his analysis without making 
conclusive observations regarding causation—he wrote, “The opposite of being 
definitive is not, however, to be arbitrary” (Heclo, 1974).  Policy scholars accepted 
Heclo’s criticisms and revisions of the stages approach and brought forth many 
alternatives—including Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith’s ACF.  Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith described and critiqued their framework in their book, Policy Change 
and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach (1993).  
 The ACF alternative to the stages heuristic describes policymaking 
outcomes as a response to both internal and external variables, and incorporates the 
influence of policy subsystems upon policy outcomes.  Scholars leveraged Heclo’s 
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contributions regarding the influence of external factors in public policy 
formulation, and political scientists sought to address additional gaps in the stages 
heuristic with their framework.  They broadened Heclo’s observations regarding the 
influence of exogenous factors upon policy changes, but rejected his dismissal of 
empirical studies.  Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith are among scholars who believed 
models should incorporate causal elements, while the stages heuristic lacks a vehicle 
for empirical testing.  The ACF recognizes the contributions of the stages approach 
for describing policy change but then extends it with the addition of causal factors.  
Scholars applied the ACF in empirical case studies, and their work resulted in 
observations leading to additional ACF hypotheses and refinements of existing 
ones.  These studies surpassed the quality of data drawn from studies and enabled 
greater exploratory power.  In the subsequent literature review, several studies that 
employed similar approaches to this research are described. The ACF’s inclusion of 
subsystems and its appreciation for the influence of policy knowledge extends the 
study of policy making from the confines of traditional bureaucratic bounds to 
include dynamics beyond them.  The ACF’s acknowledgement of subsystem actors 
allows researchers to flip the typical top-down approach to policymaking and 
incorporate the crucial influence of subsystems.  The framework describes the 
policy process in the manner shown in Figure 1: 
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Figure 1: ACF Policy Process 
In order to distinguish the ACF from other theories of the policy process, Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith established five central assertions: First, they recognize the 
influence of technical information.  Legislators are becoming increasingly savvy 
users of technical information and frequently request analyses and information 
papers from subject matter experts, independent auditors, and program managers. 
This point is relevant to the research question: a query from Congress for a specific 
GAO investigation exhibits increased interest in a topic, reflecting intended learning 
among legislators. Such technical information concerns “The magnitude and facets 
of the problem, its causes, and the probable impact of various solutions” (Sabatier, 
1978; Crandall and Lave, 1981; Mazur, 1981).  
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 The second assertion regarding the ACF is that it should be applied to 
longitudinal data drawn from a time perspective of a decade or more.  This allows 
scholars to incorporate policymaking cycles and to chart influences over time.  
Using data for a longer span also permits scholars to tease out the subsystems, 
coalitions, and relationships that emerge around deep and policy core beliefs.  In the 
late 1970’s Weiss convinced many scholars that short-term consideration of 
decision-making underestimates the influence of policy analysis. Cohen and 
Lindblom (1979) indicated that the cumulative effect of learning from many sources 
coupled with inherent ordinary knowledge influence policy most significantly 
(Sabatier P. A., Policy Change Over a Decade or More, 1993).  
 Third, subsystems are a key feature of the ACF—the framework 
incorporates interaction of actors from different institutions who follow and seek to 
influence governmental decisions in a policy arena.  This departure from institution-
specific study of policymaking is particular to the ACF and has since been 
incorporated into additional policymaking models. Subsystems identified in this 
case study include representatives of private sector port authorities, transportation 
security officials, national laboratory personnel, GAO auditors and radiation 
detection equipment program managers.   
 Fourth, the ACF incorporates elements beyond the bureaucracy.  Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith suggest that such analyses limit the conception of policy by 
excluding those who evaluate and disseminate information as a broader collection of 
other actors in government.  This proposition allows for consideration of a breadth 
of policy change causes.  Here, the influence of subsystems outside of government, 
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including private sector and academia, allow a researcher to extend the search for 
causal relationships beyond the bureaucracy.  In this case, the inclusion of another 
factor outside of the iron triangle, issue attention, furthers the quality of the analysis.   
 The final assertion of the ACF is that “public policies or programs can be 
conceptualized in the same manner as belief systems, i.e. as sets of value priorities 
and casual assumptions about how to realize them” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, The 
Advocacy Coalition Framework, 1999).  This fifth premise is crucial to the process 
of charting actors over time, and facilitates the ability to observe learning of 
technical information and its potential relationship to policy changes (Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, The Advocacy Coalition Framework, 1999).  The products of this 
study include observations about the way in which members of the nuclear security 
subsystem shifted into, and out of pro-detection equipment coalitions.  The 
expectation was that, as these groups acquired technical understanding, accrued 
policy knowledge, and validated assumptions about the manner in which detection 
systems would work, they would shift their beliefs accordingly.  Deep core beliefs 
reflect shared belief systems and are normative.  Policy core beliefs represent 
“normative commitments and causal perceptions across an entire policy domain or 
subsystem,” and secondary beliefs are far more narrow (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework, 1999).  The primary focus of this study is 
upon the secondary beliefs of members of the nuclear security subsystem as related 
to strategic implementation of radiation detection equipment, particularly the way in 
which pro-detector coalitions received information that eventually impacted the 
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level of broad support they placed in emerging technological answers to the nuclear 
terrorism threat.   
 Today’s legislators must thrive in a dynamic environment that includes 
lobbyists who attempt to influence decisions.  Sabatier describes the importance of 
being attentive to the value of technical information and policy knowledge 
throughout the policy process, and asserted its importance to the understanding of 
policy change.  The ACF describes policy change as the result of various processes.   
The first process relates to the interaction of competing advocacy coalitions 
within a policy subsystem.  The second addresses changes external to the 
subsystem in socio-economic conditions, system-wide governing coalitions, 
and output from other subsystems that provide opportunities and obstacles to 
competing coalitions.  A third relates to the effects of stable system 
parameters such as social structure and constitutional rules—on the 
constraints and resources of the various subsystem actors (Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition 
Approach, 1993). 
  
 Weible and Nohrstedt noted the importance of simplifying these various 
subsystems by aggregating actors into one or more coalitions (Weible C. M.-S., 
2011).  In this case, many actors assimilated into broad coalitions that played a role 
in the deliberations.  Laboratory personnel assigned to federal headquarters 
educated policymakers about technology and explained and promoted options for a 
global nuclear detection architecture.  These experts also facilitated the planning and 
execution of equipment test series.  Private industry corporations provided research 
and development initiatives as well as prototype equipment for field use.  Existing 
public-private partnerships continued among those who were deploying equipment 
prior to the terrorist attacks.  Congressmen advocated for slices of massive 
emergency supplemental funds to come to their states and districts.  Media, 
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nongovernmental organizations, and think tanks provided assessments and opinions.  
Their testimony and products were provided to Congress and helped influence 
Congressional decision-making.  Newspaper stories details programmatic progress 
and setbacks, oftentimes in great detail. In this study, subsystems are competing for 
resources toward the same end—different military, law enforcement and border 
security entities are seeking some combination of intelligence, tools and training to 
disrupt a nuclear attack.  Although initially there was no polarized, vigorous 
opposition to investment in nuclear detection equipment, longitudinal analysis 
indicates that the manner in which these coalitions participated in hearings to pursue 
solutions changed dramatically.  Also during the subject decade, GAO served as 
gatekeeper for sorting out how the equipment did or did not perform to meet the 
threshold for threat material identification.  Technical reports from equipment test 
and evaluations played a crucial role in determining whether equipment could 
eventually meet expectations.  Yet, ultimately, the program plans for 2016 bear only 
a minor resemblance to the robust expectations set in 2003. 
 In order to make observations about how these factors did or did not 
contribute to policy change, the hypothesis for this project was derived from an 
ACF policy change hypothesis.  Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s earliest models of the 
ACF incorporated the public opinion factor in the policymaking process, and 
iterations of the ACF highlight the impact of public interest with even greater 
priority, parsing it as an independent external influence.  ACF incorporates public 
interest among external events labeled broadly as “changes in socioeconomic 
conditions”.  This progressive approach to explaining the process of policy change 
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later expanded to include a greater variety of exogenous influences in a more 
specific manner. Today’s ACF reflects that emphasis, “The basic argument is that 
although public opinion is seldom knowledgeable enough to affect policy specifics, 
it can certainly alter general spending priorities and the perceived seriousness of 
various problems” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, The Advocacy Coalition Framework: 
An Assessment, 1999).   
 Figure 1 indicates changes in public opinion might serve as an external 
factor that influences policy outputs. Capturing public opinion as issue attention is 
possible using the IAC, as well as data from other resources such as Lexis-Nexis, 
Gallup Polling data, and Google Trends.  Marrying these concepts into one 
longitudinal view enhanced the ability to accurately identify certain crucial 
moments in the case study.   
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Advocacy Coalition Framework: Literature Review 
 Scholars continued to broaden their perspectives regarding policy change by 
considering how factors beyond bureaucratic actors might impact policy over time.  
Using legislative content analyses, longitudinal ACF studies of policy change 
helped to shape a more inclusive approach to understanding policy dynamics.  The 
origins of U.S. nuclear detection capabilities and the sources and causes of 
associated policies can be addressed with the ACF because researchers are able to 
incorporate subsystems into the understanding of the nuclear security policy and 
program development processes.  One of the primary benefits the ACF offers is its 
ability to use the framework to focus on belief systems of advocacy coalitions.  
A belief system guides coalition members concerning the problems that 
should receive the highest priority, the causal factor that needs to be 
examined most closely, and the governmental institutions most likely to be 
favorably disposed to the coalition’s point of view. (Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith, Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach, 
1993) 
 
 Observations of subsystem actors may be made through their participation in 
professional forums such as Congressional hearings and panel discussions. A 
common approach to charting the strategies and activities of advocacy coalitions is 
through the review of such testimonies over time.  This technique may expose how 
coalitions adapt or alter their beliefs and potentially lead to policy changes such as 
negotiations, acquiescence, or other shifts, particularly when an exogenous factor 
influences the process.  According to the ACF, scientific information influences 
coalition beliefs. Montpetit (2011) represented recent scholarship that essentially 
reversed the causal direction of these influences by saying that controversy 
generates scientific uncertainty rather than the contrary.  This point that remains 
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debated by ACF scholars.  Readers should also recognize that Montpetit’s (2011) 
ACF application did not include the measurement of coalitions, learning, or policy 
change; that is, he emphasized a different theoretical terrain (Weible C. M.-S., 
2011).  
 Several ACF case studies consider policy learning and the process of issue 
familiarization as factors leading to policy change as reflected by a shift in beliefs. 
Sabatier and Anne M. Brasher (1993) found evidence of this phenomena in 
“Environmental Policy at Lake Tahoe, 1964-1985”. They observed negative 
significant relationship between environmental priorities and regional planning early 
in the study that switched to positive (and significant) after 1973.  “This finding 
suggests that as Tahoe elites gained experience with regional planning and 
environmental policy, they increasingly realized that intergovernmental relations 
and substantive value priorities were related” (Sabatier & Brasher, From Vague 
Consensus to Clearly Differentiated Coalitions: Enviornmental Policy at Lake 
Tahoe, 1964-1985, 1993).  This observation affirms the design of the ACF to 
include contributions of coalitions beyond those who traditionally participate in a 
policymaking subsystem.  The Tahoe case study (1993) revealed the importance of 
relationship building between city planners and environmental activists. Likewise, 
national nuclear defense requires broad coordination and cooperation among 
subsystem members beyond the traditional defense realm—the input of shipping 
companies, ports authorities and international corporations helped to inform the 
national strategy.   
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 Pierce (2011), Nohrstedt (2011), and Albright (2011) conducted studies 
using legislative content analysis to address their research questions.  In his 
longitudinal study “Coalition Stability and Belief Change: Advocacy Coalitions in 
U.S. Foreign Policy and the Creation of Israel, 1922-1944”, Jonathan J. Pierce 
reviewed U.S. foreign policy data from legislative hearings using coding of core 
beliefs over a two decade span.  Pierce sought to determine if deep core and policy 
core beliefs held stable over time.  He bound his study by drawing only from 
hearing data that specifically related to the question of the British Mandate of 
Palestine.  Pierce based his use of congressional hearings upon the technique used 
by Jenkins-Smith & St. Clair in their 1993 article, “The Politics of Offshore 
Energy”.  Although Pierce is one of a handful of scholars who utilized longitudinal 
content analysis, he still cited reliance on legislative testimony as one of the 
limitations to his methodology. This study emulates the approach used by Jenkins-
Smith and St. Clair.   
 Nohrstedt’s article, “Do Advocacy Coalitions Matter? Crisis and Change in 
Swedish Nuclear Energy Policy” (2009) reviewed the course of developments in 
Swedish nuclear energy policy in the 1970s and 80s.  Nohrstedt sought to avoid 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s concerns about reliability and validity of the 
documentation of policy coalitions.  They observed that without systematic 
gathering of data, researchers could not truly confirm that members shared policy 
core beliefs.  (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An 
Assessment, 1999)  To address this matter, Nohrstedt utilized a systematic approach 
to charting coalition members.  “To not only remedy these problems (of relativity 
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and validity in documentation) but also to increase comparability with previous 
systematic ACF studies, this study is based on a systematic documentation of the 
Swedish nuclear energy policy subsystem” (Nohrstedt, Do Advoacy Coalitions 
Matter? Crisis and Change in Swedish Nuclear Energy Policy, 2009).  Like Pierce, 
Nohrstedt analyzed testimonies using a coding scheme.   
 This systematic documentation research design is emulated in this 
dissertation. This study also considers Nohrstedt’s observation: “ACF theory 
postulates that various external shocks and crises can disrupt otherwise stable 
subsystems.  Disruption takes place when new actors enter policymaking, when 
actors change position from one coalition to another, or when policy resources are 
redistributed.” Nohrstedt observed fluctuations in patterns of participation in 
accordance with crises, and applied the ACF “as a theoretical basis for 
understanding the development and effects of policy conflicts in crisis resolution.”  
Nohrstedt’s (2013) article “Advocacy Coalitions in Crisis Resolution: 
Understanding Policy Dispute in the European Volcanic Ash Cloud Crisis” touches 
on the role of technical information.  “Crisis resolution thus requires public 
managers and leaders to digest and respond to complex information about social and 
natural phenomena.  In some cases, crises reinforce pre-existing controversies 
among stakeholders and actors involved in or affected by crisis response operations” 
(Nohrstedt, Advocacy Coalitions in Crisis Resolution: Understanding Policy 
Dispute in the European Volcanic Ash Cloud Crisis, 2013, p. 965).  Such cases 
include high-stake events in which stakeholders have strong incentives to use 
technical information in an advocacy fashion as a basis for legitimizing actions 
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supporting organizational agendas and normative policy beliefs (Sabatier P. , 1987; 
Comfort, 2007).  “Gauging theoretical approaches to grasp the evolution of policy 
disputes in the context of high-stake crises is thus a legitimate concern for 
researchers as well as practitioners” (Nohrstedt, Advocacy Coalitions in Crisis 
Resolution: Understanding Policy Dispute in the European Volcanic Ash Cloud 
Crisis, 2013).  He delineates scientific information into two categories:  
Scientific information was used for both instrumental and political purposes.  
Instrumental use of information refers to the use of expert-based information 
to solve policy problems and thus has a direct impact on policymaking.  The 
volcanic ash crisis provides additional insight into how stakeholders 
mobilize scientific information to counter arguments by their opponents 
(political use of information)  (Nohrstedt, Advocacy Coalitions in Crisis 
Resolution: Understanding Policy Dispute in the European Volcanic Ash 
Cloud Crisis, 2013). 
 
His case also illustrated that, “Specifically, it (the case) shows that scientific 
information can accumulate rapidly and serve as the basis for policy change under 
conditions of threat, urgency, and uncertainty” (Nohrstedt, Advocacy Coalitions in 
Crisis Resolution: Understanding Policy Dispute in the European Volcanic Ash 
Cloud Crisis, 2013).  The data collected in this study reflect this phenomenon.   
 Another characterization of scientific information is as “policy knowledge.” 
This terminology is introduced in the article “Policy Knowledge, Policy 
Formulation, and Change: Revisiting a Foundational Question” by Thomas E. James 
and Paul D. Jorgensen.  Policy Knowledge transcends scientific information by 
incorporating phases of analysis and evaluation into understanding of policy change.  
These scholars indicate that policy theories including the ACF will benefit from an 
understanding of “how and which information decision makers use.”  They believe 
this will clarify and facilitate concepts associated with policy knowledge, process, 
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and change (James & Jorgensen, 2009).  Policy knowledge plays an important role 
in policy making because it may be strategically exploited—“In return, researchers 
and other policy experts are important allies in the policy process since they provide 
the competence required for interpreting and framing technically complex 
problems” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). The GAO is among the key players in this 
case study; it provides Congress thorough investigative audit products of 
government programs in a manner that clarifies issues and seeks ground truth for 
Congress by providing recommendations for action.  Their testimonies, along with 
the informed statements of witnesses called before House and Senate Homeland 
Security Committees, contributed to legislator accrual of policy knowledge.   
 In consideration of (2009) Jorgensen’s observations, this dissertation 
provides a tool for tracking instances of policy knowledge accrual, and in 
conjunction with the analysis and evaluation provided by various subsystems 
(auditors, the scientific community, the DNDO) renders observations about how 
policy knowledge and issue attention might be responsible for dramatic changes in 
DNDO programs by charting these variables over time and their impact on the 
DNDO budget. Perhaps this study can contribute to an area of policy theory James 
and Jorgensen saw as lacking: “There is little systematic investigation into why, 
when, and how decisions makers utilize policy knowledge, especially regarding 
which policy knowledge actors use” (James & Jorgensen, 2009).  These authors 
recommended research that utilizes policy knowledge as an independent variable 
affecting the policy process.  This project is designed accordingly, emphasizing the 
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role of scientific information and issue attention as independent variables affecting 
fiscal year budget decisions.  
 The following Methodology Chapter includes study design, an explanation 
of variables, and a full explanation of the study design. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Methodology 
Overview 
 
 After a brief review of the case, this section of the dissertation will describe 
the components of the case study and the manner in which it is conducted.  The 
research questions, datasets, details of data identification and collection techniques 
are explained in this chapter.  The code word list, coding sheets and coalition 
assignments and description of the data reliability process are also mentioned in this 
Methodology chapter and referred to in the Codebook Samples found Appendix 2 
and Terminology section of Appendix 3. 
 This case study chronicles the emergence of a domestic national nuclear 
detection equipment capability from 2003-2013.  The enthusiasm and broad support 
for nuclear detection equipment that marked the 2003-2005 timeframe changed 
dramatically when cost and performance issues emerged, particularly in 2008, when 
a dramatic policy change occurred.  This study incorporates the IAC and the ACF to 
make observations about that particular policy change by utilizing longitudinal data 
drawn from Congressional hearings and news stories.  With appreciation for the 
multi-factor analysis capabilities the ACF provides, and with understanding that the 
IAC infers a mechanistic view of public attention, the case study is designed to 
maximize the exploratory power each offers (H. Jenkins-Smith, personal 
communication, May 13, 2016).   The ideal outcome of this methodology results in 
analytical products that reflect the manner in which technical information and policy 
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knowledge impacted decision-making; it also incorporates the public opinion 
behavior and its influence upon policy decision processes.   
 The basis of this project’s hypothesis is derived from one of several ACF 
hypotheses related to policy change: 
(Alternative) Hypothesis 5/Policy Change Hypothesis 2 (revised): 
Significant perturbations external to the subsystem (e.g., changes in 
socioeconomic conditions, public opinion, system wide governing coalitions, 
or policy outputs form other subsystems) are a necessary; but not sufficient, 
cause of change in the policy core attributes of a governmental program 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy 
Coalition Approach, 1993).  
 
Upon developing the adapted hypothesis, “Radiation detection program budget 
decreases occurred in conjunction with a gradual decline in public attention and 
enhanced Congressional policy-oriented learning,” the following research questions 
took form: 
Research Questions 
1. Is there a relationship between Congressional policy knowledge, public 
interest and budget decisions? 
2. Does the timing of increased Congressional policy knowledge and 
declining public interest coincide with decreased budget allocations? 
3. Do other phenomena anticipated by the IAC and ACF emerge from these 
variables? 
4. Can the IAC be validated as a tool for measuring public issue attention in 
this case? 
 Annual fiscal year budget allocations to the DNDO serve as the dependent 
variable representing policy change.  Budget changes that occur in conjunction with 
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declining constituent issue attention and increasing Congressional policy knowledge 
confirm the influence of exogenous factors as the ACF suggests and the presence of 
Heclo’s traditional bureaucratic politics upon policymaker decisions.  In this case, 
budget allocations reflect the policy core beliefs of the subsystems: budget increases 
from Congress are evidence of support of radiation detection equipment as a 
significant part of U.S. nuclear threat deterrence, while decrements are indicative of 
declining support of radiation detection programs.  Below is an overview of each 
component: 
Unit of Analysis: This project uses annual Fiscal Year budgets for radiation 
detection programs (FY) as the unit of analysis.  This study is limited to decisions 
associated with the expansion and contraction of the DHS DNDO budgets from 
2003-2013. 
Dependent Variable: Policy Change, as reflected by annual FY budget allocations 
for nuclear detection programs (USD $) 
Independent Variables: Policy Knowledge reflects the accrual of policy technical 
knowledge by legislators.  Public Issue Attention reflects public attention measured 
by single story counts of articles related to domestic nuclear detection equipment 
and is corroborated by other measures drawn from Gallup Pooling Data and Google 
Trends Data.  Table 2 describes these variables in greater detail. 
Table 2  
Independent Variable Streams of Evidence 
 
Public Issue Attention: This variable reflects public attention measured by single story counts of 
articles related to domestic nuclear detection equipment.  Gallup Pooling Data and Google Trends 
Data drawn from the same timeframe corroborate measurement validity. 
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NEWS ARTICLES 
 
The New York Times 
(64) 
The San Jose Mercury 
News (11) 
The Washington Post 
(63) 
 
 
GALLUP 
 
Gallup’s polling data 
archives include a 
variety of national-
security related 
surveys posed to the 
public. 
 
GOOGLE 
 
Google Trends data 
illustrate public search 
engine web queries of 
“domestic radiation 
detection”. 
 
LEXIS-NEXIS 
 
Total “domestic 
radiation detection” 
news items from 
U.S. papers. 
 
Data: Using Lexis-Nexis, headlines from stories including terms “domestic radiation detection” are 
listed in the codebook.  (For a sample from the codebook, See Appendix Two).  These headlines are 
listed by item title, date, headline, and byline.  Coders then assigned positive or negative sentiment 
for each story.  
 
Gallup data were selected from the archive of terrorism-related polling surveys conducted from 
2003-2013.  The selected question represents the most applicable question. 
 
The Google Trends website provides rescaled graphical depictions of search queries.  The terms 
“domestic radiation detection” are also utilized for producing this graph. 
 
 
 
Policy Knowledge: This variable reflects the accrual of policy technical knowledge by 
legislators. 
 
 
HEARINGS 
 
This variable is measured through the 
frequency of statements and question and 
answer bundles in 65 Congressional House 
and Senate Homeland Security hearings from 
the 108th-113th Congresses.   
 
 
GAO REPORTS 
 
This variable is measured through the frequency 
of statements provided in GAO reports 
submitted to Congress from 2003-2013 related 
to radiation detection equipment programs.   
 
 
Data:  1,043 individual statement or question and answer bundles from 65 pertinent 
Congressional homeland security hearings are populated in the database with hearing date, title, 
committee, witnesses, speaker name, speaker affiliation and questioner, and statement or question 
and answer identifiers.  The coder then determined whether the item has a political or technical 
theme, and if that item provokes a positive or negative sentiment. 
   
 
 There are many factors that influence policy change.  The ACF provides a 
process for directly incorporating such factors into a single approach.  This study 
acknowledges causal factors and recognizes that some remain unknown and 
unaddressed, while others are acknowledged but accounted for as residual by this 
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design. Often times, as in the case in this experiment, I encountered a small sample 
size. Including more samples is the best remedy for addressing the conservative bias 
that often occurs with small samples (that is, the presumption that there is no 
relationship, or that the relationship is not strong).  Given the confines of this 
particular study, the whole population of pertinent hearings is still a small size, n= 
65.  The population of pertinent news items amount to 193.  This does not mean the 
research is not worth conducting—it simply means that a good experimental design 
addresses this threat to validity and, if sample size cannot be increased, I was 
prepared to address it otherwise. “One of the most pervasive threats to the validity 
of the statistical conclusions reached in the behavioral sciences is low power.  It is 
critical in planning experiments and evaluating results to consider the likelihood that 
a given design would detect and effect of a given size in the population” (Cohen J. , 
1988).  Therefore, while this project produces substantial amounts of data, the n is 
small, so standard statistical analysis of the data was unlikely to be very useful.  
Instead, the primary analysis was a visual analysis of graphs of key variables, 
lending to a less quantitative, soft interpretation of the data.  Certainly, in the case of 
a policy change, no researcher can expect to account for each factor that might 
influence a decision. Of this challenge Cohen writes, “We can hope to manipulate or 
measure only a small number of likely factors of any event.  The remainder we 
either fail to recognize or recognize but do not account for in our model” (Cohen J. , 
1988).  In this case, some of the recognized, but not accounted for, factors include: 
competing budget priorities, the persistence of Al-Qaeda’s nuclear intentions and 
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ability to commit resources thereto, and the success or failure of other government 
programs.  
 In order to provide the robust longitudinal data the ACF utilizes for making 
observations about causes of policy change, both data sets are drawn from the 2003-
2013 timeframe. Observations are compiled and considered in conjunction with 
dependent variable data representing program budgets for the same time period.  If 
data reveal that policy knowledge instances elicit negative reactions from 
legislators, and those instances occur in conjunction with instances of negative 
media coverage, the timing and effect is notable. While not necessarily indicative of 
causation, this outcome suggests an observable correlation.  In this study, the ACF 
and IAC propositions may not be isolated as the causation for budget decrements, 
but evidence of their effect upon the budget dependent variable is notable.  
Additionally, a lack of pattern would have, of course, undermine both the IAC and 
the ACF, as the hypothesis is logically deduced from those theories.  The next 
section describes these variables in greater detail and reviews how the data 
collection process took place.  
Data Collection and Variables 
 As aforementioned, one substantial challenge of this study is the 
demonstration of measurement reliability.  In the following variable sections, 
arguments are made to support each measure. Also in each section, content is 
provided to describe deliberations associated with the development of a measure for 
each variable.  
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 Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier’s 1993 revision of the ACF suggests that 
“Scholars have largely neglected a potential gold mine for examining changes in 
elite beliefs over time: the content analysis of public hearings, other government 
documents and interest-group publications…has numerous advantages” (Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach, 
1993).  Although there are limitations to the analysis that can be provided by the 
observations drawn from hearings alone, this project does provide analysis beyond 
partisan politics—it does provide longitudinal analysis of beliefs over time, and it 
does include content from representatives of the public, private and academic 
subsystems (see Appendix 1, Organizational Affiliations).   
First, a strategy for identifying and compiling copies of each pertinent hearing was 
compiled.  “A hearing is a meeting or session of a Senate, House, joint, or special 
committee of Congress, usually open to the public, to obtain information and 
opinions on proposed legislation, conduct an investigation, or evaluate/oversee the 
activities of a government department or the implementation of a Federal law. In 
addition, hearings may also be purely exploratory in nature, providing testimony 
and data about topics of current interest. Most congressional hearings are published 
two months to two years after they are held” (Government Printing Office).  
Congressional hearings are one of five types, either exploratory, legislative, 
visibility, oversight or complaint.  Table 3 shows a list of committees with 
jurisdiction to call hearings related to national nuclear defense.  This study limited 
searches to the most common venues for discussion of radiation detection 
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equipment programs: the House Homeland Security Committee and the Senate 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committees.  
Table 3 
Congressional Committees 
 
Limiting the study to the Homeland Security hearings enabled me to focus on 
retaining the same sample of participants in a static venue, thus clarifying 
observations of learning over time.  Congress called many hearings to review issues 
such as the status of the nuclear terrorism threat, nonproliferation activities, and the 
nation’s strategic objectives for deterrence.  Hearings provide a structured 
environment for the social sciences researcher; it is therefore fitting to leverage the 
opportunity to make observations. Testimony directly related to this research 
question was accessed through Library of Congress’s Congressional Record 
database searches, which accesses the U.S. Government Publishing Office Federal 
Congressional Committees 
Senate House 
Appropriations Appropriations 
Armed Services Armed Services 
Budget Budget 
Commerce, Science and Transportation Energy and Commerce 
Energy and Natural Resources Foreign Affairs 
Finance Homeland Security 
Foreign Relations Intelligence 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Science, Space and Technology 
Intelligence Transportation and 
Infrastructure 
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Digital System (GPO FDsys) database.  A variety of various test keyword runs were 
experimented with before I identified the words that pulled the targeted sample of 
hearings.  Searches using the words “nuclear” or “radiation” or “equipment” or 
“nuclear security” identified a wide collection of hearings whose subjects included 
medical treatments, energy and the state of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.  Refining the 
search to employ more specific keywords produced successful searches that 
collected the targeted data. 
• The combination of “Domestic Nuclear Detection” and “radiation detection 
equipment” keyword searches nets hundreds of items prior to filtering.  Each 
of the searches begins with the 2003 date range in order to capture the initial 
DHS discussions of radiation detection equipment programs.  Filters were 
enabled to then draw the lists of House and Senate Homeland Security and 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committees, as well as 
associated Select and Subcommittee hearings.  This produced a population 
of 37 hearings, 31 of these were held by the House Committee and the 
Senate Committee held 6.   
 
• Keyword searches using “GAO” and “Domestic Nuclear Detection Office” 
were likewise run, producing 61 House hearings and 20 Senate hearings. 
 
After printing the information screen of each of these hearings, I reviewed them 
individually for relevance.  Duplicate listings were purged.  Hearings in which any 
of the unique keywords (“Domestic Nuclear Detection Office”, “radiation detection 
equipment”, “Government Accountability Office”) are mentioned in an isolated or 
passing manner are purged if their mention lacked proper context with regard to this 
study.  For example, the single entire mention of the keyword that hit in one purged 
hearing read as follows: “DHS would need to standardize purchases of explosive, 
metal, and radiation detection equipment.”  While this statement is noteworthy to 
taxpayers and became an action item for DHS, the equipment is simply part of a 
generic list and its mention did not develop into a broader, specific discussion of 
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this equipment.  Upon completion of this task, 65 hearings remained (See Appendix 
Five, “Hearings List”).  This search produced 65 hearings equating to several 
thousand pages of material from the 108th-112th Congresses. In total, I read nearly 
4,000 pages from the 65 hearing transcripts.  From these, 1046 Statement or 
Question and Answer items were identified and coded as the screenshot from the 
codebook displays (see Appendix 2). Hearings and reports are selected because of 
their pertinence to radiation detection equipment.  Keyword searches were initially 
employed to select the hearings to be coded, and these hearings were then read line 
by line.  Portions of the hearing related to the study were highlighted and then coded 
into the schema. Included among these 65 hearings are the instances of GAO reports 
to Congress because these reports are submitted for the record in their entirety and 
therefore easily available for integration to the coded data pool.  Furthermore, the 
collection of GAO items provides the most reliable representation of the types of 
technical knowledge provided to Congress.  
 Coding of the content of each legislative hearing results in data that reflects 
the attitudes of members over time. Each member’s opening statements and pursuits 
of a topic during their allotted question and answer time in a hearing is a reflection 
of their pursuit of additional information.  The most straightforward way to measure 
the accrual of policy knowledge is with a frequency count. For example, if a 
member returns their time to the chair or does not use the full five minutes, it can be 
presumed that the member is satisfied with the details provided by the witness or 
has nothing further to explore.  When a member inquires for further details during 
their opening statement or vigorously pursues a line of questions with a witness, it is 
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reasonable to conclude that the member is in the process of gaining more knowledge 
through the responses and details provided in the venue from both witnesses and 
other members.  
 The purpose here is to make observations about the sense of Congress and 
subsystems regarding the detectors as a solution to dealing with the threat of nuclear 
terrorism.  Changes in the sense of Congress and the subsystem provide us with 
that—it is not necessary to conduct more minute analysis to glean that impression. 
Three decisions were made during the course of coding an item.  First, is the item 
presented as a statement or a question and answer bundle?  Second, is the item 
technical or political?  Third, is the item positive or negative?  For example, in the 
case of the bundles, it is possible for a Congressman to ask a “negative sentiment” 
technical question and get a “positive sentiment” response.  The purpose is to 
identify the overall sentiment of the bundle as the exchange occurred, and whether 
the outcome ultimately reflected positively or negatively upon the topic. Instructions 
indicated that opening remarks are coded as individual items.  Questions by 
members of Congress and answers by a witness are coded together as a bundle.  
Coders considered whether the information presented in the hearings by witnesses 
and other members elicited a generally positive or generally negative sentiment.  
Coders made these determinations with the following philosophy in mind:  
Comments casting doubt upon the viability of the program are characterized as 
negative.  Comments primarily supportive of the program are characterized as 
positive.  
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 To aid in graphical analysis, each item could be coded as one of the 
following: 
• Political Negative Statement 
• Political Positive Statement 
• Technical Negative Statement 
• Technical Positive Statement 
• Political Negative Question & Answer 
• Political Positive Question & Answer 
• Technical Negative Question & Answer 
• Technical Positive Question & Answer 
 
 Speaker names and professional titles are compiled to aid my analysis, but 
speaker affiliations were the significant pieces of data in terms of the research 
questions for this study.4 The coding activity was designed to identify instances of 
policy knowledge accumulation, and these instances were subjectively derived. The 
detailed statements, specific questions, and other nuanced exchanges occurred in 
each hearing venue and are highlighted from the body of the transcript. After fully 
reading each hearing and identifying each instance, the instances were coded.  Then 
individual hearing sentiment tallies are counted and logged. As an example, if an 
exploratory hearing has 5 statements and 30 question and answer bundles, a total of 
35 items are counted.  These 35 items are distributed and assigned to the either the 
positive or negative sentiment category. All hearing data is populated into the 
mutually exclusive and comprehensive categories.  In instances where an item could 
be assigned to more than one category, the coder determined which emerged most 
prominently, and assigned a category according to that determination. A second 
coder provided positive and negative sentiment assignments to a random sample of 
                                                
4Another study might consider if there are any notable frequency and sentiment differences among 
exchanges between House and Senate members during these hearings.   
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news and congressional hearing items. This secondary coder insured intercoder 
reliability.5  
 Nearly all in-depth, exploratory hearings dedicated to the issue of radiation 
detection equipment programs occurred in the House and Senate Homeland Security 
Committees, so this study draws from those bodies.  Other mentions of nuclear 
detection occurred in committee hearings related to broad topics such as terrorism—
these typically include a single or limited number of exchanges and lack the depth 
necessary to make an observation about policy knowledge.  It would be inadequate 
to code the various types of hearings as equally weighted, because the depth and are 
be coded as statement level or as question and answer bundles.  For example, 
radiation detection equipment programs occurred in other venues, (such as Budget 
sessions) these mentions (typically made by the DHS Secretary) only refer to 
mission requirements, whereas the committees dedicated to the Homeland Security 
                                                
5 After I completed initial coding of all news and hearing items, a second, independent individual 
with general knowledge of radiation detection equipment programs received coding instructions.  
This coder then coded a random sample of a quarter of the newspaper articles and a third of the 
coded hearing items.  Upon assigning positive or negative sentiment to each item, I confirmed 
reliability.  Of the sample of 22 coded news items, the secondary coder matched my sentiment 
assignment 20 times, indicating that approximately 91% of the time, my coded assignment could be 
validated.  Congressional Hearing data initially failed to match in 16 percent of the time—the 
secondary coder followed the same procedure and assigned positive or negative sentiment to 241 
items.  I reviewed the instances with the secondary coder and observed that sentiment assignments 
did not match in 48 instances.  Together, we determined that, of these, we considered 15 squarely 
equivocal.  Because the coding instructions indicate that the assignment must be either positive or 
negative, this difference indicates that there are occasions in which the coders did not make the same 
choice, and brings intercoder reliability to approximately 87 percent.  It is notable that in the majority 
of these instances, the written records both coders indicate some sort of note to this effect (such as a 
“?” indicating uncertainty or a note, “Could be either?”.  Of the remaining 33, I noticed several that 
were incorrectly logged, and the rest are considered a difference of opinion altogether.  It is also 
notable that the bulk of the conflicting sentiment assignments occur in one particular hearing 
involving the GAO and DNDO leadership.  The coders discussed this and think this is possibly 
because, in their role as auditors for Congress, their feedback can be helpful for identifying and 
correcting issues in government programs.  Such criticisms might be considered positive, as they 
should ultimately lead to positive change and improvement.  On the other hand, critical assessments 
from GAO may also result in budget cuts, management changes, strategic redirection, etc., all of 
which are unfavorable, negative circumstances.      
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mission delve into greater detail and provide a more accurate reflection of 
Congressional policy knowledge.  Although this manner for determining overall 
sentiment is seemingly laborious, it is the most effective and efficient way for 
honing in on the status of these issues in a way that is befitting of a longitudinal 
study. The purpose of this level of coding is to chart Congressional exposure to 
information and whether scientific information informs policy change.  Thematic 
coding is a superior means for coding hearing data because it allows a “single 
assertion about some subject” (Holsti, 1969).  
 Congressional staffers, specifically legislative affairs professionals, play a 
critical role in forming and guiding member statements and expertise.  These 
individuals formulate reading packets, briefs, and hearing materials, including lists 
of questions and requests from witnesses.  Members leverage the expertise of 
another member’s staff by listening intently during a hearing or holding information 
sessions outside of chambers to learn more about a topic.  It is appropriate to include 
statements made to the body by members as well as those from invited witnesses for 
this reason.  The hearing provides an opportunity for members to hear from 
witnesses, but also from each other, thus enhancing the accumulation of knowledge 
not only by way of the witnesses testifying, but through the collective experience 
the legislators have over time. 
 Because few members and witnesses testify repeatedly, proper names are 
noted in the coding records, but the emphasis is upon noting who is a part of the 
hearing process, either as Congressional committee members or as representatives 
of government agencies, NGOs, or interest groups over the course of two or more 
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years.  Ultimately, as Barke explains, “Operationally, we look for policy learning in 
explicit or consistent changes in behavior that make outcomes more congruent with 
stated or inferred goals.  The relevant learning may be about procedures that make 
goal attainment more likely, or it can be about the substance of policies, such as 
empirical facts, causal relationships, political necessities, and so on” (Barke, 1993).  
The collection of coded data allowed me to observe this learning over time.  The 
coding guide reflects instances of technical versus political exchanges as well as the 
sentiment of these exchanges. 
 Another reason why the hearings provide valuable information is because 
they are conducted under the guidelines of Parliamentary Procedure.  Due to this, all 
attendees are afforded similar opportunities to present questions and exchange their 
viewpoints in a participatory manner.  The committee chairperson is obliged to 
ensure that participants are allocated such opportunities. Parliamentary procedure 
therefore promotes structure and order that in turn promote testimonial data that is 
suitable for recording, coding and measuring as policy knowledge data as described 
in this study design.  The use of parliamentary procedure promotes a rigor that 
decreases threats to external validity presented by measuring learning in alternate 
manner.  In the representative government of the U.S., the pool of Congressional 
members participating in any given Homeland Security hearing may include 
medical professionals, attorneys, businesspeople and career politicians.  Their range 
of knowledge on any given topic may span novice to expert.  This design accounts 
for that by collecting longitudinal observations of the Committee bodies over time, 
not of individual members.  The learning concept is applied to the body of decision-
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makers, not on the individual level.  Because resource decisions are made with a 
majority vote by the body, learning experiences are observed accordingly.  Limiting 
the study to House and Senate Homeland Security hearings also generally promotes 
participant consistency.  
 The same code words were then employed to search for related news items 
via Lexis-Nexis.  In this portion of the content analysis, I used newspaper headlines 
as a measure to chart public issue attention as either “positive” or “negative” by 
reviewing the lead segment of the article as pulled.  This initiative drew data from 
three select papers.  This longitudinal article pull resulted in the collection of a total 
of 138 news stories.  The coding method employed for this research is designed to 
identify trends in the news coverage of radiation detection equipment programs, 
thus reflecting the public’s attention and exposure to the issue. This method 
provides us with longitudinal public sentiment data reported by these three media 
sources using the same positive or negative sentiment characterizations as employed 
in the coding of hearings.  Analysis of this data considers the positive/negative 
aspects of the coverage and, separately, the total amount of coverage as an indicator 
of public issue attention.  Determining if the reporting provokes a positive or 
negative sentiment from a reader, I am also able to compare this sentiment against 
the sense of Congress as revealed by the coding of hearings.  
 This overview provided the basis for the study and described data collection 
techniques. The next three sections describe the rationale for each variable 
selection—budget as a dependent variable, and policy knowledge and public issue 
attention as independent variables.   
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Budget as the Dependent Variable 
 Budget changes influence policy because the breadth and depth of programs 
is contingent upon the funding support received through FY allocations.  Budgetary 
allocations also indicate where programs comparatively stand in the realm of 
Congressional priorities each year.  Domestic radiation detection equipment 
programs received funding before the DNDO was established in 2005.  In 2003, a 
detection test bed project at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 
transitioned from DOE to the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) of DHS.  
S&T’s role at DHS is to lead national science and technology research. S&T’s 
mandate allows for their coordination and partnership with private companies, 
institutes, universities, and laboratories.  Within the S&T portfolio, the Weapons 
and Mass Destruction Incident Management Division initially provided 
management and support for the mission.  Throughout 2004, S&T managed the 
development and deployment testing of portal monitors. In 2005, the DNDO was 
authorized: “There shall be established in the Department a Domestic Nuclear  
 Detection Office (referred to in this subchapter as the “Office”). The Secretary may 
request that the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary  
of State, the Attorney General, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the 
directors of other Federal agencies, including elements of the Intelligence 
Community, provide for the reimbursable detail of personnel with relevant expertise 
to the Office. The Office shall be responsible for coordinating Federal efforts to 
detect and protect against the unauthorized importation, possession, storage, 
transportation, development, or use of a nuclear explosive device, fissile material, or 
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radiological material in the United States, and to protect against attack using such 
devices or materials against the people, territory, or interests of the United States” 
(U.S. Government, 2005).  Federal civilians, military officers, national laboratory 
experts, and other individuals with appropriate skill sets were recruited to join the 
existing DHS staff.  Robust funding ensured DNDO could pursue research and 
development projects, deploy test beds, conduct exercises, and continue to invest in 
improving existing equipment and operations.   
 For the purpose of this research, budget figure data is most informative in 
the context of the federal budget cycle.  Rather than a singular focus upon the total 
amount of FY authority, a retrospective assists in an understanding of what policy 
knowledge and issue attention events were occurring when fiscal decisions were 
made.  The formulation of the President’s budget occurs roughly 19 months before 
the Fiscal Year. That budget is transmitted to Congress, who, over the course of the 
next ten months, take appropriation action by September 30 of the prior FY (barring 
a Continuing Resolution). Congress makes appropriations decisions are throughout 
the 10 months leading up to the October 1 start of the FY. Therefore, the decision to 
authorize a significant decrease in the FY 2010 budget emerged at or around April 
2008. 
Public Issue Attention as an Independent Variable 
Measuring public interest presented a challenging task.  I pursued a variety 
of methods for identifying trends in public support of nuclear security programs and 
determined that major newspapers are the most useful indirect measure of public 
issue attention.  Newspaper headlines are archived and available for longitudinal 
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studies, and major newspaper editorial boards are generally consistent with their 
approach to weighting the topics, and with how they consider what is newsworthy 
or notable to consumers on any given day.  News items are pulled from reputable, 
long-standing media outlets with electronic archives—in this case, from The New 
York Times, The Washington Post and the San Jose Mercury News.  The electronic 
repositories of these papers allow for headline and story searches over the 
timeframe. The conclusion is that the public maintains a generally persistent interest 
in the topic of nuclear terrorism, but this interest is akin to other subjects that 
provoke periodic, generalized fear (such as a flurry of news coverage addressing 
natural disasters, diseases, cyber attacks, financial catastrophes).  The relationship 
between exposure to news stories that is actually measured in this variable is 
deemed the most likely reflection of public interest in domestic nuclear detection at 
the time because there is no other historical longitudinal measure that can reflect 
robust face validity desired to most accurately measure issue attention.  In this case, 
it was determined that the best way to measure public interest is by measuring how 
much exposure (and therefore, how often the public was reminded of) the nuclear 
terrorism issue.  Headlines provide data for exposure frequency, but also allows for 
a sample that can be coded as either positive or negative coverage.  Special news 
reports, investigative reports, panel discussions, and in-depth print features detail 
the threat of nuclear terrorism.  
However, because these articles provide an indirect reflection of public issue 
attention to chart through the IAC, two alternate tools were utilized to validate the 
data provided by the newspaper coding technique.  Google Trends data and Gallup 
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Pooling data supply repositories of historical information that, when considered in 
conjunction with the data collected per this methodology, ultimately confirmed the 
predictions of the IAC as evident in this case.  Each of the three—the newspaper 
coding done for this project, and the Google Trends and Gallup Pooling data 
indicated the similar public issue attention behaviors from 2003-2013.  
Confirmation of the efficacy of the IAC allowed the research plan to continue using 
the data according to its phases.   
The Washington Post and The New York Times are widely circulated and 
popular among members of Congress and their staffs.  The San Jose Mercury News 
is distributed out of the West Coast and has the sixth widest circulation among 
dailies in the United States.6  These three papers were selected to reflect some of 
news material Americans and members of Congress are likely to encounter.  The 
New York Times published more than 14,000 stories about Al-Qaeda from 2003-
2012; of these, more than 1,000 included mention of the organization’s nuclear 
pursuits.  Sixty-four of these stories are pertinent to radiation detection equipment 
over the course of this study’s timeframe.   
Gallup Polling questions related to nuclear terrorism are not thematically 
consistent during the 2003-2013 timeframe; this forced me to make a subjective 
decision regarding the intent of each poll and the spirit in which the respondent 
answered the question.  For example, a direct question: “Does the prospect of a 
                                                
6 The New York Times and The Washington Post are two of the most widely read newspapers in 
Washington, D.C., and are also considerably circulated nationwide.  The third paper selected for this 
project is The San Jose Mercury News.  This paper was selected because it is the most widely 
circulated newspaper in the west, with the exception of The Los Angeles Times.  (Daily circulation in 
print: The New York Times 1,897,890; The Washington Post 431,521; The San Jose Mercury News 
546,282 (Alliance for Audited Media, 2013). Searchable archives for these newspapers are available 
through Lexis-Nexis.    
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nuclear terrorism attack frighten you?” would certainly evoke an affirmative 
response.  But an indirect question, “How concerned are you that a nuclear terrorist 
attack could affect you or someone you love?” would not elicit the same absolute 
reply.  Ultimately, making comparable observations over time using polling data, 
despite the robustness provided by the scientific rigor employed by organizations 
such as Gallup, was not possible for this niche issue area.  Instead, I utilized a 
Gallup poll that reflects American perception of terrorism as degrees of likelihood 
over time.  This trend line provides a useful benchmark for making comparisons of 
it to the Google Trend and IAC tools. 
Likewise, Google Web Trends using the keyword searches “domestic 
nuclear detection” produces graphs of rescaled search queries from 2003-2013.  
With the exception of a minor uptick in 2011 that relates to a surge of interest in the 
Iranian nuclear program, the Google Trends data fit nicely against the other 
frequency charts.   
Independently, these graphs do not relate to the hypothesis for confirmation 
of association. When they are overlaid with budget data, an association is exhibited 
if the two graphs alternative hypothesis cannot be rejected; support for the null 
hypothesis indicates no correlation between exogenous variables and policy change.  
Policy Knowledge as an Independent Variable 
 There is significant debate among scholars as to what constitutes policy 
knowledge.  A most effective way to observe policy knowledge is through policy 
core changes.  For example, major budget decrements indicate that legislators have 
accumulated knowledge that informs their belief that a program is not performing as 
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expected.  Legislators allocate significant resources to a program with the 
impression that a solution is available or that an investment will produce an 
operational solution.  
 In this study, data for the policy knowledge independent variable is drawn 
from Congressional hearings data, including that derived from GAO participation in 
the hearings.  Hearings are a suitable medium for pursuing an understanding of 
Congressional policy knowledge and the progress of policy knowledge is because 
they provide an environment that provokes analytical debate.  “The task, then, is to 
identify the conditions under which a productive analytic debate between members 
of different advocacy coalitions is likely to occur.  The indicator of such a debate is 
that one or both coalitions are led to alter policy core aspects of their belief 
system—or at least very important secondary aspects—as a result of an observed 
dialogue rather than a change in external conditions” (Jenkins-Smith & St. Clair, 
The Politics of Offshore Energy: Empirically Testing the Advocacy Coaltion 
Framework, 1993).  Congressional hearings over time revealed many instances 
when factors (such as exchanges of technical information) draw coalitions away 
from their policy core beliefs through debate, statements, and question and answer 
sessions.   
 Because no incidents of domestic terrorism occurred during the course of 
this longitudinal study, Committee members ultimately remained unsettled by 
additional exogenous shocks that may have otherwise influenced their shared deep 
core commitment to U.S. national security.  The influence of technical information 
and new knowledge contributes to shifts in policy core beliefs and eventually leads 
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to declining resource support.  The legislator’s advancement of their collective 
policy knowledge, and the influence of constituent interest (or lack thereof) are 
isolated as factors potentially contributing to the domestic nuclear detection policy 
shift.  The frequency of statements and question answer bundles in hearings over 
time provides data, but the rich insights are drawn from what those exchanges do or 
do not include, what events surrounded the exchanges, their tone, and who spoke.  
Numerous scholars describe the importance of these exchanges and the manner in 
which they contribute to decision-making.   
 The ACF considers policy change beyond legislative bodies and includes 
subsystems.  In this case study, the hearings provide a rich data set for a number of 
reasons. There are instances in which a hearing may call for bicameral participation, 
allowing both House and Senate members to share the venue and benefit from 
witness and member exchanges as a legislative whole.  Developing a coding schema 
to capture participant data and determine organizational affiliations was crucial in 
terms of the ACF.  This coding allowed me to acknowledge the role of affiliations in 
this theoretical framework by charting their shifts among coalitions as beliefs 
change over time. For this project, the broad nuclear security policy subsystem 
includes national laboratory personnel, port authorities, legislators, nonprofit 
advocates, and program managers from the DOE, DOS, DOD, DHS and the 
Executive Branch as represented by department secretaries. Auditors from the GAO 
are also among consistent participants in the hearings. Their testimonies were 
grouped into six organizational affiliations. Each of these entities (and a few others) 
presented testimonies regarding nuclear detection equipment to Congress during the 
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timeframe 2003-2013.  (For a list of Organizational Affiliations, see Appendix 
One).  All together, this subsystem shared a core commitment to domestic security 
and initially also shared policy core beliefs that supported defense against a nuclear 
or radiological terrorist attack with radiation detection equipment deployments at 
international seaports, airports and border crossings. Other subsystem members 
including legislators, program managers, interest groups and private sector 
businesspeople participated together in hearings.  Coded testimony revealed shifts in 
affiliations and policy core beliefs over time.  First, beliefs centered around core 
U.S. national security interests, and later with differing secondary policy beliefs 
regarding the manner in which the national security mission could be addressed with 
radiation detection equipment.  
 The relevance of GAO’s contributions to the subsystem is also essential to 
the policy knowledge component of this research.  GAO, in support of 
Congressional oversight, provides the following services to Legislators: 
• Auditing agency operations to determine whether federal funds are being 
spent efficiently and effectively;  
• Investigating allegations of illegal and improper activities; 
• Reporting on how well government programs and policies are meeting their 
objectives; 
• Performing policy analyses and outlining options for congressional 
consideration; and 
• Issuing legal decisions and opinions, such as bid protest rulings and reports 
on agency rules (Government Accountability Office, 2016). 
 
Each of these is essential to Congress’s decision making.  Performance 
assessments and other evaluations of program performance are based upon detailed 
independent reviews, and all options are developed by GAO subject matter experts 
and based upon findings drawn from interviews, source documents and other 
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products they encounter during an inquiry. The technical information they provide 
in their testimony is intended to inform legislators by addressing critical strengths 
and weaknesses.  “We provide Congress with timely information that is objective, 
fact-based, nonpartisan, non-ideological, fair, and balanced” (Government 
Accountability Office, 2016).  Their service is of critical importance to the policy 
knowledge required by Congress to make decisions. Based on GAO data and other 
accrued policy knowledge, legislators determine if the information indicates a 
program is not producing intended results.  Legislators may then determine whether 
they should re-scope a program, adjust the funding for the program, or make another 
core change reflective of their new knowledge.   
Replication 
 Replication of this study is possible with identification of another policy 
change event exhibiting the factors suitable for testing within the ACF: longitudinal 
pertinence, presence of subsystems, influence of exogenous events, etc.  There are 
countless initiatives undertaken by the U.S. that generate multi-year resource 
allocations as well as ongoing media coverage.  The conclusions of this particular 
case may be generalizable to future studies of policy change.  This case was 
exceptionally well-suited for consideration in the context of ACF and IAC because 
of its technicality and the lack of political polarization surrounding the deep core 
beliefs.  
 Replication requires selection of a policy change event influenced by events 
occurring throughout a decade or more.  A researcher’s design should address the 
ability to access content pertinent to the policymaking process, either through open 
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source news reporting, federal documents, legislative testimonies, interviews, or 
another resource for the dataset before proceeding, ensuring that a decade or more 
timeframe is accessible.  The researcher will then require a coding schema for 
organization of data, particularly to show technical information exchanges or other 
policy knowledge accrual over the course of the select time period. This data 
provides the basis for the researcher’s observations of the factors contributing to the 
policy change.  This study focuses upon a policy change that was evidenced by a 
significant budget decrease.  However, the dependent variable does not have to be 
reflected in this manner.   
Methodology Summary 
 In order to consider the influence issue attention and policy knowledge may 
have upon policymaker budget decisions, I conducted a qualitative analysis of 
source documents.  The ACF provided a testable hypothesis for incorporating 
accumulation of policy knowledge within the longitudinal timeframe, while the IAC 
provided a context for structuring longitudinal public issue attention by organizing 
analytical products into phases. Headlines drawn from three select newspapers are 
coded and organized according to the phases of the cycle, thus providing details of 
the public’s interest in the issue overtime. A relational content analysis of select 
hearings from the 108th-112th Congresses by the House Committee on Homeland 
Security and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs (2003-2013) provided the compilation of data needed to test the policy 
knowledge factor of the hypothesis. In the next chapter, graphical depictions of 
policy-oriented learning and public interest as dependent variables are presented in a 
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variety of ways to display their relationship with budget policy changes.  I sought to 
determine whether there is a correlation among nuclear detection policy changes, 
policy knowledge, and public issue attention.  Using content analysis by coding, I 
identified, listed, counted, and determined sentiment of newspaper headlines for the 
public issue attention variable as an exogenous factor influencing policy change.  I 
then identified, listed, counted, and determined sentiment for the second variable, 
policy knowledge, as reflected by statements and question and answer exchanges in 
House and Senate Homeland Security hearings. This data was compiled using 
Excel’s sort, search, chart, graph, and statistical functions. 
 Various charts and graphs were compiled to aid analysis.  Among them, a 
graph of political and technical knowledge instances, depicted in conjunction with 
newspaper headline frequency, is presented longitudinally against a FY budget 
backdrop. Another reflects the persistence of newspaper reporting on the issue of 
nuclear detection equipment.  Others show coalition participation.  There are a 
variety of additional graphical analyses that could be compiled with this data, 
including political party over time, department representation over time, and other 
displays of coalition participation in terms of broad and individual categories.  The 
analytical products presented here are intended to relate directly to the hypothesis 
and research question.  The data collection and analysis undertaken in this study 
further confirms the presence of the ACF and IAC’s exploratory power for this 
case—while not reflective of causation, the analysis chapter will detail a variety of 
instances in which the ACF and IAC are suitable for application to this case. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
Analysis 
Introduction 
 After an overview of answers to the research questions, this Analysis 
Chapter first presents data from Google and Gallup that confirm the efficacy of the 
IAC as a tool for making general predictions about public attention behaviors.  
Then, the chapter presents a variety of analytical products that indicate the precise 
manner in which public issue attention and Congressional policy learning factors 
support the research hypothesis.  This chapter provides analytical products and 
conclusions based upon qualitative analysis of data and collective observations 
derived from content identified per the methodological plan described in Chapter 
Three.  The objective of these analyses is to draw conclusions regarding the 
usefulness of the IAC as a tool for consistently predicting the behaviors of the 
public as related to an issue receiving national attention.  Next, an explanation for 
the rejection of the null hypothesis in this case is provided, and support for the 
alternative hypothesis is detailed.  This objective is completed in the context of the 
ACF policy subsystem, with particular attention to public issue attention as a factor 
external to the subsystem and policy knowledge accumulation as a factor 
influencing bureaucratic actors internal to the subsystem.  
This Analysis Chapter is arranged to provide a historical account and 
analytical products in terms of the IAC phases as described in Figure 6. The IAC 
provides a vehicle for organizing data, observations and findings in a longitudinal 
way.  In each phase, pertinent data and analysis reflecting the phase are presented 
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both in terms of their place in the context of the IAC and the ACF. First, the 
Research Questions are answered.   
Research Questions, Answered  
1. Can the IAC be validated as a tool for measuring public issue attention in 
this case? Yes, Google Trends and Gallup data, as secondary and tertiary 
sources of issue attention provide supporting evidence of the phases of 
public issue attention as described by Downs (Downs, 1972). 2. Is there a relationship between Congressional policy knowledge, public 
interest and budget decisions?  In addition to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis, this research indicates exogenous factors such as public issue 
attention and internal factors such as policy knowledge influence policy 
change in this case study.  According to the hypothesis derived from the 
ACF and in conjunction with the IAC, I expected to find radiation 
detector program policy changes occurred when Congressional policy 
knowledge accumulated while a decline in public issue attention was 
underway. Although I did not isolate causation with this project, I did 
observe that the significant adjustments made to the FY 2010 DNDO 
budget occurred in 2008.  The federal budget process begins 18 months 
prior to the budget release.  In this case, the 20 percent reduction of the 
FY 2010 DNDO budget was determined by decisions made in 2008 and 
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2009.7  The two independent variables over time are shown with no 
other extraneous information, broadly supporting the essence of the 
research hypothesis, that is—major policy change in 2008 is associated 
with a decline in public issue attention and increase in policy knowledge.  	  
3. Does the timing of increased Congressional policy knowledge and 
declining public interest coincide with decreased budget allocations? 
Yes, legislators accrued radiation detection equipment-related policy 
knowledge over time, and in 2008, a significant number of technical 
exchanges occurred.  This heightened Congressional inquiry coincided 
with a decline in public issue attention, as indicated by a decline in news 
reporting and search engine queries.  Together, these factors may 
indicate a relationship with the 2008-09 Congressional votes which 
significantly reduced the FY 2010 DNDO budget. 
4. Do other phenomena anticipated by the IAC and the ACF emerge from 
these variables? Research verifying the validity of the IAC as a tool for 
anticipating public attention phases to major domestic issues is provided.  
A general observation about the nature of advocacy coalitions can be 
made, particularly in terms of the behavior of the Law Enforcement and 
Private Sector coalitions.  In this case, these coalitions initially invested 
time and resources into sharing their positions regarding radiation 
                                                
7 
 
(Hourihan, 2014). 
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detection equipment. These coalitions’ core commitments to border 
security remained aligned to the subsystem, but their secondary policy 
core beliefs did not.  After a variety of challenges, these coalitions 
shifted their emphasis.  The emergence of divergent secondary policy 
beliefs dominated testimony much of the 2008-2009 timeframe.   
Research Question #1: Can the IAC be validated as a tool for measuring public 
issue attention in this case? 
 Prior to conducting analysis directly related to the research hypothesis, news 
item data related to the IAC factor presented the following frequency data.  Figure 2 
depicts the number of radiation detection equipment-related news stories that the 
three newspapers published each year, and provided a baseline for comparing the 
research data to other public issue attention measure tools.  Of the 138 news stories 
from these three sources, seventy-one of the stories are coded as positive and sixty-
seven of these stories are coded as negative. This indicates a balance in reporting 
from 2003-2013, but the analysis section will delve into the particulars of this data, 
which show that the majority of the negative reporting occurred in the later half of 
the longitudinal timeframe.  This study design considered that story counts do not 
directly measure public issue attention.  Due to this, additional data sets from 
Gallup, Lexis-Nexis and Google present additional information to bolster the data 
provided by this study’s measure.  These data indicate that the public’s overall 
interest through queries (see Figure 4, Google Web Search) and news exposure (see 
Figures 2 and 3) and perception of the threat (see Figure 5) all follow the same 
general pattern as predicted by the IAC. 
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Figure 2:  Domestic Nuclear Detection Equipment Stories, 2003-2013 
Next, Figures 3-5 exhibit the three metrics intended to confirm that the IAC 
could logically support public issue attention behaviors.  After determining the 
manner in which the data could be represented by the phases of the cycle, it became 
possible to compare IAC phases to trends recorded by Google and Gallup.  The 
following two sections exhibit the Google and Gallup data as related to the 
“domestic nuclear detection” search terms. 
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Search Engine Trend Data as a Reflection of the IAC 
 
Figure 3: All Nuclear Detection News Stories, 2003-2013 
Figure 3 shows the frequency of searches for the terms “domestic nuclear detection” 
using the Lexis-Nexis search feature.  Despite the snapshot, the graph still portrays 
similar cycles of attention as that of the news data collected for this study, including 
a rapid decline in public interest leading into 2009 and the minor resurgence of 
interest as budget cuts and a redefined DNDO mission are announced.  This graph 
must be considered with the additional understanding that in 2010 and 2011, three 
additional events led to surges in reporting: the Nuclear Security Summit, Iran’s 
nuclear program, and the earthquake that caused the Fukushima nuclear disaster.  
Each of these three major news events specifically detailed efforts to utilize 
radiation detection equipment for safety and security purposes, making isolation of 
news items specific to this case study particularly challenging in the search.  
Therefore, the sources of these peaks in this timeframe are at least partially 
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unrelated to this project.  Unlike the data pulled and sorted specifically for this 
project, Google Trends draws all stories containing these keywords.  Corrected for 
these instances, the chart would reflect the ongoing gradual decline of public 
interest phase that began in 2008.  The following headlines are among those readers 
saw in 2010 and 2011: from The Washington Post in 2010, “No Plan Formed to 
Keep Bomb Materials From Crossing Borders” and from The New York Times in 
2011: “Nuclear-Detection Effort Is Halted as Ineffective”. 
Figure 4 is a snapshot of output from Google Trends, displaying a rescaled 
trend line reflecting Google user queries of the terms “domestic nuclear detection” 
from late 2004-2013 (Google Trends, 2016): 
 
Figure 4:  Google Web Search, “Domestic Nuclear Detection” 
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The 2005 establishment of DNDO is observed, as is the gradual decline observed 
from 2006-2008, which reflects waning public interest.  Figure 4 corroborates the 
data collected through the public interest measure in this study. Encouraged by the 
general similarity of Google Trends alongside the research news data, Gallup data 
was then considered for its ability to validate the IAC measure developed for this 
project.   
Gallup Trend Data as a Reflection of the IAC 
Analysis of the following Gallup polling data also reflects IAC phases—
9/11’s profound effect upon Americans, their sustained interest and concern about 
terrorism, and eventually, a plateau reflecting a gradual decline of concern.  
Although Figure 5 shows a seven-percentage point decline in the likelihood of 
terrorism from month 2006 to August 2006, a Gallup poll conducted in August 2006 
indicated that forty-seven percent of Americans polled believed it to be “likely” that 
a terrorist would set off a bomb containing nuclear or biological material (Gallup, 
2006).  Integrating this observation into the assessment of public issue attention 
over this same timeframe, this graph lends to a conclusion that Americans shifted 
their attention to other issues as the significant post-9/11 preoccupation with the 
terrorist threat steadied after 2003. By 2008, concerns about impending terrorist 
attacks plateaued, reaching a near low in 2010.   
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 (Saad, 2011) 
Figure 5: Gallup Perception of Likelihood of Terrorism 
 In summary, in terms of the hypothesis for this dissertation, I am able to 
validate that the measure developed for this study can be applied to the IAC in this 
case. Internet search engine trends and Gallup polling data alongside data collected 
for this project corroborate the value of the IAC in terms of this case study.  The 
graphical depictions of public issue attention indicate each of the phases of the IAC 
as expected.  The comparisons reflect similar cycles of public issue attention as 
news data collected in this study reflect, and indicate that Downs’ impression that 
the public drive media coverage.  From this, I am able to validate the efficacy of 
using the data I collected for charting public issue attention during the time of the 
study, which then contributes to analysis using the ACF to describe the subsequent 
policy change. I aimed to contribute a case study that ties the IAC and the ACF 
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together to make observations about policy change as longitudinal data catalyzes 
into a major shift of policy core beliefs.  
Research Question #1 Findings 
 Informed by analysis of the data derived from the coding activities included 
in the dissertation design, historical documents, personal knowledge and along with 
the additional information derived from other sources of public attention, (Google 
Search Trend and Gallup Polling Data), support the IAC for this case study in the 
following phases shown in Figure 6: 
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 Upon confirming the relevance of the IAC as a suitable model for 
considering the events of this case, data from the policy knowledge variable is 
incorporated into the analysis.   
 The hearing data collected for the policy knowledge variable reveal how 
members of the nuclear security subsystem participated in coalitions, and also how 
these coalition core, policy core and secondary policy beliefs shifted throughout the 
course of the longitudinal timeframe.  The influence of new knowledge and other 
internal and external factors upon subsystem members is explained by the ACF.  
This subsystem engagement (May, Sapotichne and Workman, 2009) reflects how 
policymakers attend to learning and seek additional policy knowledge when a 
widespread policy disruption such as terrorism occurs.  In this case study, the need 
for a keen understanding of the mechanics of radiation detection equipment as well 
as the possibilities of future generation equipment became imperative to legislators. 
Congress sought to make immediate and effective decisions regarding the safety of 
American seaports and metropolitan areas that might be targeted in a nuclear 
terrorism event, but few had any reason to understand the science of nuclear 
material detection prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The emergence of advocacy 
coalitions occurred in an interesting way.  Initially, all parties indicated support of 
detection equipment resources and there was very little dissent among members of 
Congress.  Core beliefs centered upon a strong commitment to domestic security. 
The broad consensus that an Al-Qaeda nuclear threat did indeed present a legitimate 
concern to U.S. domestic security, coupled with an understanding that domestic 
points-of-entry presented the most significant vulnerability guided discussions in the 
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early years.  As time passed, the blanket support of detection programs began to 
diminish by individuals who retained the same core commitment to national security 
began to fragment into advocacy coalitions with differing secondary policy core 
beliefs.  The identification of persistent coalition members at the individual and 
entity levels helps researchers recognize and track policy and core policy beliefs.  
Collecting and reviewing longitudinal data aided me in identification of policy 
evolutions where they might otherwise be imperceptible.  
Table 4 
Beliefs Applied to Case Study  
Deep Core 
(Normative) Beliefs: 
 
The broadest and 
most stable among 
the beliefs and are 
predominately 
normative 
Policy Core Beliefs: 
 
Moderate scope and span 
substantive and geographic 
breadth of a policy subsystem.  
Subsystem specificity makes 
them ideal for forming 
coalitions; resistant to change 
but likely to adjust with new 
information 
Secondary Policy 
Beliefs: 
Secondary beliefs are 
more substantively and 
geographically narrow in 
scope, and more 
empirically based; most 
likely to change over time 
 
Broadly bipartisan 
and subsystem-wide 
support for homeland 
defense 
• Pro-Radiation Detection 
Equipment 
• Pro-Law Enforcement and 
Human Intelligence 
• DHS management of 
detection equipment 
programs 
• Department-specific 
management of nuclear 
interdiction assets 
(Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009, pp. 122-123) 
 Munro credits Sabatier and confirms in his “California Waste Water” article 
that, as the dominant policy core is challenged, minority coalitions emerge with 
significant powerbases (Murno, 1993).  In this case study, I observe the emergence 
of a pro-detector coalition made up of members from the national laboratories and 
the Department of Energy, and eventually the Department of Homeland Security, 
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whom successfully marketed current and future-generation radiation detection 
equipment as a solution to the threat of nuclear terrorism.  From the start of the 
U.S.-based detection deployment initiatives through 2013, the coalition advocating 
detector deployments shifted from highly supportive (large funding and resource 
allocations) to less supportive (fewer funding and resource allocations).  Despite 
acquiescence to reduced funding in fiscal year 2010, this pro-detector coalition 
persisted with a secondary belief centered upon technical interdiction as its strategic 
foundation.  Equipment performance shortcomings led to the identification of 
alternate technologies and further investment into research and development.  
 The dashed black line in Figure 7 shows the sudden withdraw of the law 
enforcement coalition after 2006, which could be indicative of their determination 
that detection tools were just a small part of the suite of requirements front-line 
officers required to adequately promote secure borders.  Also at this time, there is a 
significant decrease in the level of participation among Private Sector Coalition 
members.  The initial participation of port authorities and representatives of 
shipping organizations waned once they advocated according to their requirements 
as equipment end users.  These early sessions provided the law enforcement, 
customs, and shipping industry with the opportunity to describe their roles and 
responsibilities to Congress. The spike in 2005 includes such instances, as well as 
occasions when, as DNDO emerged with its mission, Coalitions advocated for the 
manner in which they would interface with DNDO.  These occasions also allowed 
for feedback regarding equipment use in the field to date.  The law enforcement and 
private sector coalition supported DNDO and also lobbied for radiation detection 
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equipment funding from 2003-2013.  Yet, as the detectors failed to meet 
expectations, significant changes to DNDO’s initial strategic domestic nuclear 
security architecture became necessary.  The strategic vision for port and border 
security shared in 2003 became untenable.  Thus, the energetic support that the law 
enforcement personnel conferred upon the pro-detector coalition from 2003 through 
mid-2006 dwindled.  At this time, law enforcement, as well as private sector 
participants returned to their policy core beliefs, focused primarily upon advance 
intelligence and human element interdiction.  If available, radiation detection 
equipment integrated into these existing law enforcement operations. By 2008, 
public interest in national security issues subsided significantly, and the 
accumulation of policy-relevant knowledge among Congressmen and other subject 
matter experts began to influence secondary and tertiary beliefs regarding further 
investment in the equipment.  
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Figure 7:  Comparison of Hearing Coalitions  
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After making a strong case initially for resources and support, CBP scaled back their 
optimism regarding the impact of equipment alone.  In 2005, CBP Commissioner 
Stephen Flynn indicated that the Euphoric Optimism once expressed by Customs 
and the American public was being undermined by a variety of practical issues in 
the field.  In a hearing that year, he said: 
Commander Flynn. Mr. Chairman, if I can on that issue, one of the biggest 
problems is the disconnect between radiation portal monitors and gamma 
scanning and whether or not detection can happen. CBP may have good 
equipment, but when they are not used together, the central problem is this.  
Radiation portals won’t help you with shielded weapon, which would be a 
loose nuke. It won’t help you with a shielded RDD, a dirty bomb. And it 
won’t help you with highly enriched uranium because it doesn’t give off 
enough of a signature vis-a-vis the background. So to rely primarily on a 
radiation portal technology, it is not helping us with the scariest problem set. 
But when you have a radiation portal, it forces the shielding because they 
know you could detect it for the dirty bomb problem, particularly. Then your 
imaging would say there is a big cylinder object or whatever here in the 
middle of a shipment of sneakers. That is a problem. So part of the issue is 
DOE has been marching off deploying radiation portals entirely isolated 
from DHS’s effort. DHS only uses the gamma for a very small population, 
because that is all they have the resources to do. They ask other countries to 
apply it in the same way. And these two worlds haven’t come together. So it 
is not the technology itself is a problem, it is how we integrate the 
technology, how we integrate it with data. 
 
And I will just highlight another issue, keeping the information. 
We are not storing the information after we get these images. Storage is 
cheap, but CBP is tossing it away. CBP is basically throwing away a 
forensic tool if something went wrong, or even a tool that CBP can learn 
from over time. I don’t understand why that is happening, but for stuff 
coming across the Canadian border, as soon as the image is taken, within a 
day or so, the image is gone. CBP dumps it. It makes no sense that CBP is 
not storing this and trying to learn from it, as well. So it is the technology 
has limits, but it is more about how we integrate it, how we interface with 
software, how we use human judgment as a part of the process.  
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Figure 8:  Comparison of Government and Academic Hearings 
The law enforcement community is the primary user of radiation detection 
equipment.  However, the rapid withdraw of this coalition from the hearing process 
did not greatly impact the future of the program, as DNDO and its coalition 
continued to pursue the GNDA.  This seems to suggest that although the law 
enforcement coalition shared the same core policy beliefs with DNDO and 
advocated for radiation equipment capability, they only felt obliged to contribute 
actively in the early stages.  Upon articulating their concerns and receiving 
assurance that they would be addressed, they decreased their participation in 
hearings.   
 In the meantime, there is observable coalescing between DNDO and the 
scientific coalitions who begin to participate with tandem frequency in hearings as 
the Committee called them together to state their cases.  A tit-for-tat tempo 
emerged; DNDO, backed by national laboratories, testified in support of a positive 
future for radiation detection programs, seeking to counter some of the critical 
testimony offered by GAO and members of the law enforcement coalition, who 
gradually pulled representatives to a less favorable opinion of the equipment. 
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Research Question #2: Is there a relationship between Congressional policy 
knowledge, public interest and budget decisions?   
 In addition to the rejection of the null hypothesis, this research indicates 
exogenous factors such as public issue attention and internal factors such as policy 
knowledge influence policy change. In this case study, Congress does reveal 
increased policy knowledge over time, and correspondent to this learning, decisions 
that reflect that learning are made. Furthermore, major policy change coincided with 
a decline in public interest in this national security topic as the hypothesis 
anticipates.  Congressional policy change did occur in conjunction with their 
increased policy knowledge and decreased public issue attention; however, this 
relationship cannot be isolated as causal.  Data portray the influence of coalitions, as 
described ACF, and also reflect the cycle of public attention as predicted by IAC.   
Finding: Rejection of the Null Hypothesis 	  
 This research design does not isolate effects upon the budget (independent 
variable) in a manner that affirms that the two factors—public issue attention and 
policy knowledge—were alone the cause of policy change.  While the accrual and 
effect of policy knowledge is evidenced by the coded hearing data, the influence of 
public issue attention upon the process of Congressional decision-making is not 
isolated with this study design.  However, in light of additional confounding factors, 
(including shifts in political power, macro-level federal budget demands, perception 
of a diminished Al-Qaeda threat, and other pressing policy challenges) it is clear 
that radiation detection equipment programs are undoubtedly influenced by 
exogenous factors and increased knowledge, and thus, the null hypothesis is 
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rejected.  Specifically, this research shows the direct influence of ten GAO reports 
to Congress describing equipment performance failures, cost overruns and other 
limitations throughout the subject timeframe.  See Appendix Six, GAO Reports 
Related to Nuclear Detection, 2005-2013. The remainder of this Chapter will 
describe the evidence in this case.   
Finding: An Inverse Relationship Between Hearings and News at the Time of 
Major Policy Change 
According to the hypothesis derived from the ACF and in conjunction with 
the IAC, I expected to find radiation detector program policy changes occurred 
when Congressional policy knowledge accumulated while a decline in public issue 
attention was underway. Although I did not isolate causation with this project, I did 
observe that the significant adjustments made to the DNDO FY 2010 budget 
occurred in 2008. Figure 9 exhibits this relationship.  The two independent variables 
over time are shown with no other extraneous information, broadly supporting the 
essence of the research hypothesis, that is—major policy change in 2008 is 
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associated with a decline in public issue attention and increase in policy knowledge.
 
Figure 7: Comparison of Hearings and News Stories 
The 1046 coded items drawn from 65 Congressional hearings, and the 193 
items drawn from three major newspapers reveal that the most significant policy 
change associated with DNDO took place between 2008-2009.  At this time, 
Congress authorized a 20 percent decrease in DNDO’s FY2010 budget, and that this 
policy change could be the result of declining public attention and increasing 
legislator policy knowledge.  This general observation can now be pursued in terms 
of the research hypothesis as it unfolds through the lens of the IAC.   
 The data displayed in Figure 9 inform a variety of conclusions.  The 
predominant value of this chart is in its depiction of the IAC, particularly as it 
relates to national public attention transitions, and the inverse response from 
Congress.  Although there is no indication of a direct causal relationship, the 
public’s shift from the Alarmed Discovery and Euphoric Optimism (2001-06) phase 
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to the Realizing the Cost of Significant Progress phase (2006-07) of the IAC 
occurred as Congress intensified scrutiny of DNDO’s efforts during this time.   
Research Question #3: Does the timing of increased Congressional policy 
knowledge and declining public interest coincide with decreased budget 
allocations? 
 Increased Congressional policy knowledge and declining public interest do 
coincide with decreased budget allocations, specifically in terms of the 2008-09 
votes that determined the FY2010 DNDO budget.  The following analysis delves 
into this conclusion.  These findings longitudinally trace how Congressional 
knowledge surged from 2006-08, as public issue attention declined, marking the 
“Realizing the Cost of Significant Progress” and “Gradual Decline of Intense Public 
Interest” phases of the IAC. This stage involves the gradual acknowledgement that 
the cost of “solving” the problem is very high. However, in order to address the 
research hypothesis most accurately, the events leading up to the policy change in 
terms of both public issue attention and the anticipated subsystem behavior per the 
ACF are presented in these contexts.  The next section describes the events that 
occurred prior to the major policy change.  This analysis validates the manner in 
which Congressional knowledge accrued alongside decreasing public attention. 
These events generated the conditions necessary to create the research hypothesis 
episode.    
Realizing the Cost of Significant Progress, 2006-2008 
 Only three years after its start, DNDO began to receive mixed reviews 
regarding its lack of strategic vision and eagerness to deploy expensive, untested 
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equipment. Furthermore, the planning and execution of performance tests received 
heavy criticism from vendors, scientists, and again, the GAO.  In 2006, GAO 
released a report, “Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Cost-Benefit Analysis to 
Support the Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based 
on Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the Monitors’ Costs 
and Benefits.”  This report was the first specifically targeted at DNDO’s 
management of the radiation detection equipment mission, and one of 45 total GAO 
reports that eventually touched directly or indirectly addressed DNDO activities. 
 To identify the specific drivers for the uptick in hearings that occurred in 
contrast to a rapid decline issue attention, a list of pertinent GAO report releases 
aids in analysis.  This chart displays the release of GAO reports alongside hearings 
and news stories, reflecting the increasing intensity of interest in DNDO as 
Congress began to appreciate the formidable challenges facing the program. This 
research indicated that GAO’s issuance of multiple reports in response to 
Congressional requests for information about DNDO activities contributed to the 
increase in hearings in 2008, as indicated by Figure 10.. 
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Figure 10: GAO Hearings as Compared to All Radiation Detection-Related 
Hearings 
These figures reflect the shifting of policy beliefs that occurred in 2008.  The 
GAO conducted 46 audits related or closely related to DNDO from 2005-2013.  Ten 
of these 46 were released in 2008.  These audits are the driving force behind many 
of the technical exchanges that took place in coded hearings.  This research 
highlights the impact of GAO hearings upon Congressional learning—it must be 
recognized as a crucial part of Congress’s policy learning process.  These 
observations led to specific investigation of any significant policy decisions 
occurred in 2008 and pursue the case study according to these events—as discussed, 
this led to the identification of the 2008-09 decision to reduce the DNDO budget.  
Because the 2008 events so greatly informed Congressional understanding of the 
detection programs, data specifically to this timeframe is considered in greater detail 
in the following policy knowledge discussion.   
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Policy Knowledge Data as a Subsystem Factor 
 
Policy Knowledge Accrual (Learning) 
 
 Congress took particular interest in the nuclear terrorism issue in 2008.  The 
in-depth hearings held throughout 2008 result in 222 coded statements and bundles 
of the 972 total items coded for the longitudinal timeframe.  This indicates that 
nearly 23% of the scientific information accrued over the 2003-2013 timeframe 
emerged in 2008.  This intensified policy knowledge accrual, in conjunction with 
waning public issue attention, occurred with a decision to decrease the fiscal year 
2010 DNDO budget.  DNDO received a variety of for-action requests from both 
GAO and Congress as a result of the 2008 hearings. Legislators received 
testimonies from GAO.  Technical insights and feedback accrued during hearings 
raised Congressional awareness of equipment shortcomings.  
 In 2008, Congress chose to dramatically shift resources away from DNDO.  
I observe evidence of Nohrstedt’s conclusion: “Specifically, it (the case) shows that 
scientific information can accumulate rapidly and serve as the basis for policy 
change under conditions of threat, urgency, and uncertainty” (Nohrstedt, Advocacy 
Coalitions in Crisis Resolution: Understanding Policy Dispute in the European 
Volcanic Ash Cloud Crisis, 2013).  In this case study, the accumulation of very 
specific technical knowledge associated with the performance of detectors and the 
determination of true costs in 2008 provoked a shift from the initial commitment to 
aggressive detection equipment deployments to a far more cautious strategy.  The 
convergence of GAO audits and uptick in Congressional hearings, along with a 
decline in news coverage may be the cause of the significant shifts in secondary 
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policy beliefs.  The decline in interest is marked by a dearth of hearings in 2009 and 
then in 2010, the major budget reduction.   
 Figure 11 reflects a detailed look at the distribution of coded items across the 
various categories. This analysis also indicates a sharp decline in political-positive 
hearing statements in 2008. At this time, the majority of coalitions still actively 
supported DNDO and its mission to develop and deploy next-generation radiation 
detection equipment.  As representatives received negative technical information, 
they continued to make politically positive (e.g., “supportive”) statements regarding 
the program, indicating that their core beliefs had not changed, but a shift of 
secondary policy beliefs was certainly underway.  The high volume of politically 
positive statements reflect the deep core commitment legislators maintained to 
domestic nuclear defense in spite of the troubling reports about equipment 
performance.  The number of technically negative statements is proportionate to the 
politically positive statements, indicating that while Legislators heard criticisms, 
they maintained a supportive tone.  The impact of 2008’s negativity may be 
observed by the plunge of all positive measures in 2009.  The planning of the 
federal budget is initiated approximately 18 months prior to the start of the fiscal 
year.  The fiscal year 2010 budget is a reflection of the persistent political-negative 
and technical-negative statements made in 2008.  By 2010, hearings are marked by 
an abundance of political-negative and technical-negative statements. The 
abundance of technical exchanges, particularly technically negative statements 
supports the aforementioned conclusion made by Nohrstedt, that a rapid 
accumulation of scientific information serves as a basis for policy change.  
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Furthermore, this circumstance suggests that the compounding of discouraging 
technical information impacts political support.  These happenings, in conjunction 
with a significant decline in issue attention as indicated by the previous analysis, led 
to a decision to make major DNDO programmatic adjustments without incurring 
political capital losses. 
 With respect to James and Jorgensen’s characterizations of policy 
knowledge and learning, this study provides several revelations about its 
relationship to policy change.  In particular, with underperforming programs, the 
knowledge gathered by program evaluators does not necessarily provoke 
instantaneous change, but there is adequate evidence of gradual shift.  In this case, 
the chart indicates that political positivity of 2005 outweighed the negative question 
and answer bundles—at this early time, legislators were sufficiently motivated to 
accept some concern about equipment performance in order to press ahead with the 
vision for a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture.  The significance of conducting 
a longitudinal study is affirmed.  This chart is particularly interesting because in 
addition to exhibiting the longitudinal sentiment associated with legislator policy 
knowledge accrual, the political-positive line (the top line in the stack) mirrors 
much of the behavior of the public’s issue attention as described by the IAC.  GAO 
is able to present its findings through its reports and accompanying testimonies, and 
over time, its resources become a dominant source for Congressional policy 
knowledge.  
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Figure 11: Hearing Sentiment  
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Figure 12: Political Positive v. Technical Negative Sentiment, 2003-2013 
 Longitudinal analysis of hearings showcases learning over time, as 
legislators evolved from use of non-technical to technically specific terminology.  
The legislators are passionate, articulate, and concerned in each example.  However, 
the use of precise language to describe the threat materials and the means available 
for detecting them evolves in such a dramatic fashion that it becomes evident that 
the legislators develop informed opinions based on a depth of technical 
understanding that manifested in the hearing rooms over several years.  In 2003, 
representatives expressed a general understanding of the current state of the art in 
equipment.  Eventually, their interactions in hearings shifted from broad and generic 
political support to specific and technical inquiry, as shown in Figure 12 and in the 
following excerpts: 
The other thing that I want to say is that Mr. Weldon’s comments about 
detection and prevention, I would love you to be able to come down a little 
more in support of what Mr. Nunn and Mr. Lugar are trying to do. And that 
leads me to this question in your statement. You say that all frontline Bureau 
of Customs and Border Protection inspectors across the country receive 
personal radiation detectors to alert them to the presence of radioactive 
material.  I would say to you that that equipment they use is almost useless. 
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It doesn’t allow you to know about enriched uranium, it doesn’t allow you to 
know about plutonium. And I am curious to know what it allows you to do, 
but it doesn’t get at what Mr. Weldon knows we need to get at (Select 
Committee on Homeland Security, 2003). 
 
By 2012, the vernacular became accurate and descriptive: 
 
In your testimony, you mentioned two programs where CBP spent 
significant sums and then canceled the programs with little to show in the 
way of achievements. You specifically note that the DHS spent $200 million 
developing a new advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP), but then canceled 
the program before updating their cost-benefit analysis. In addition, DHS 
spent $113 million on the cargo advanced automated radiography system 
(CAARS) and then canceled the program (Committee on Homeland 
Security, 2012). 
 
 In response to heightened Congressional scrutiny, news reports about 
DNDO’s attempts to develop the GNDA soon became predominantly negative.  
Leading up to 2006, there were 42 positive news stories and 18 negative news 
stories.  This balanced approach to news coverage is replaced by critical reporting in 
2006 that persisted through 2012.  From 2006-2013, there were 49 negative news 
stories and only 29 positive stories (see Appendix 2 for Codebook Samples). 
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Table 5 
News Stories 
Radiation Detection Equipment-Related News Stories as 
Coded for Sentiment, 2003-2013 
Year Positive News 
Stories 
Negative News 
Stories 
Total News 
Stories 
Percentage 
Negative 
2003 15 4 19 21% 
2004 16 4 20 20% 
2005 11 10 21 48% 
2006 11 17 28 61% 
2007 7 9 16 56% 
2008 1 9 10 90% 
2009 1 4 5 80% 
2010 4 4 8 50% 
2011 0 3 3 100% 
2012 2 2 4 50% 
2013 3 1 4 25% 
 
Story frequency and sentiment of reporting from 2003-2013 are displayed in Figure 
13.  Beginning in 2003, after the Alarmed Discovery Phase of the IAC is well 
underway.  Broad endorsement and eagerness to pursue the GNDA especially from 
2003-2006 (during the Alarmed Discovery and Euphoric Optimism phases of the 
IAC) shifted to intensified scrutiny as persistent equipment limitations and struggles 
to develop a convincing strategic plan took center stage—then, after an abundance 
of critical reporting, public attention shifted to the Realizing the Cost of Significant 
Progress phase in 2006.  The chart further reflects the positive and negative 
sentiment of news items during this time—the “percentage news negative” trend 
line clearly indicates the manner in which the public soon received fewer, and 
mostly negative reports beginning in 2008. 
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Figure 13: Annual News Story Frequency and Positive Versus Negative Reporting 
Graphical representations of elite media coverage as reflected by news 
stories pertinent to the nuclear detection program provide data to chart against the 
IAC.  This data is useful to compare against budgetary decisions and policy 
knowledge observed through content analysis of legislative hearings.  The previous 
chart shows how, in 2006, the public shifts into a gradual decline in interest.   
 Complementing this news reporting frequency and sentiment chart is a 
policy knowledge frequency and sentiment chart.  This displays the fluctuation of 
positive and negative support of detection programs as coded.  After 2008’s close 
inspection of DNDO activities, the tempo dropped significantly, and of the two 
pertinent hearings in 2009, only one of them was directly related to DNDO 
activities.  The major budget reductions incurred in FY2010 were supplemented 
with additional scrutiny, such as one hearing titled, “The Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office: Can it Overcome Past Problems and Chart a New Direction?”   
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Figure 14:  Comparison of Positive and Negative Hearings by Year 
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Chairman Joe Lieberman, (I-
CT), summarizes the Realizing the Cost of Significant Progress stage by describing 
the state of U.S. nuclear detection efforts as he introduced the DNDO Director in a 
2008 hearing dedicated to the topic of nuclear terrorism: 
As we will hear from our witnesses, the responsibilities of the DNDO are 
daunting. Its first job was to perform an inventory of the 74 different Federal 
programs spread over the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, 
and the Department of State and to try to create from these a unified system 
where all the different agencies were working together to protect America.  
The reach of these programs is wide and layered, including efforts abroad, 
efforts at the border, and, of course, activities within our homeland. Many of 
these programs predate the establishment of the DNDO.  This is a significant 
effort, certainly as measured in dollars spent. During the last fiscal year, 
these programs cost a total of $2.8 billion—$1.1 billion to combat 
smuggling and secure nuclear materials held abroad, $220 million to detect 
materials at the border, $900 million for detection efforts within the United 
States, and $575 million for cross-cutting activities that support many of the 
other programs, like research and development, into detection technologies. 
The goal of a layered system, as I understand it, is that each point of the 
system will offer another opportunity to detect and thwart terrorists before 
they can acquire a nuclear weapon or to stop them before it can be smuggled 
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into the United States. But the system we have in place now, I conclude, is 
incomplete. As we are going to hear today, our global nuclear detection 
architecture—this ‘‘system of systems,’’ as one of our witnesses calls it— 
may have both needless redundancies and/or dangerous gaps, which I 
suppose in this case is the worst of both worlds. Even if each program was 
working precisely as planned, holes apparently exist in this layered security 
net that could allow determined terrorists to get their hands on weapons 
grade nuclear material and bring it into the United States. 
 
DNDO’s job is to help find and plug those gaps. But that job is made 
significantly more difficult by the fact that DNDO is just a coordinating 
agency and has no effective power to order or implement desired changes 
(Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2008). 
 
Perhaps Senator Lieberman’s comments foreshadowed the impending decline of 
public interest and ushered in indifference to the topic that prevailed thereafter, as 
the Gradual Decline of Public Interest phase emerged.  
 The following section describes how Congressional and public interest 
rapidly declined with the exception of a flurry of renewed interest as the major 
policy change decision became evident in FY 2010.   
Gradual Decline of Intense Public Interest: 2008-present 	  
 As criticisms mounted, Congress scaled back the budget significantly, 
specifically approving a zeroed out DNDO’s FY 2010 Systems Acquisition budget 
that topped $120 million previously.  This contributed to a $130 million budget 
decrease from FY 2009 to FY 2010.  It is unclear whether DNDO was advised that 
any request for additional acquisition would be declined or if they came to this 
conclusion independent of Congressional insight:	  
Senator Akaka: In 2008 and 2009, the Government Accountability Office 
reported that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is operating 
without up-to-date strategic plans or its critical investments in nuclear 
detection technologies at our borders or for its overarching nuclear detection 
efforts.  
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What is the status of your nuclear detection strategic plans? How will you 
ensure that funds requested for DNDO will be spent effectively without up-
to-date strategic plans? 
Secretary Napolitano: Well, we have obviously a strategic plan always 
underway, particularly in that very important area/.  But you might be 
interested in knowing, Senator, that we did not request funds for DNDO to 
purchase new technology this year, and the reason is because we were not 
persuaded that the technology—neither the plan but particularly the capacity 
of the technology—we needed was actually there that we wanted new 
money for.  We have enough back-funded money to continue current 
operations through fiscal year 2010, but before we come to Congress and as 
for money for new technology we needed to see something better from the 
science community and from the vendors for what we need.   
So we have gone back into that community on that basis, and it is my hope 
that moving forward, working with this Committee, we will have some 
credibility when we actually come forward and say we need this for this new 
thing, that we do not do that lightly, that we actually have a solid basis for 
that. (Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2009) 
As the research hypothesis suggests, this drastic policy change might be the result of 
Congressional learning in conjunction with constituent indifference.  It certainly 
reflects a stark contrast to the early commitments to, and expectations of, DNDO. 
After several years of intense coverage, the issue of domestic nuclear terrorism 
shifted out of both public and Congressional spotlights.  
The Post-Problem Stage 
	  
 The issue moves into prolonged limbo—a twilight realm of lesser attention 
or spasmodic recurrences of interest (Downs, 1972).  The observations made 
through historical consideration of events in the context of the IAC, production of 
analytical products, and the significant content analysis conducted by reading the 65 
Congressional hearings provided a suitable context for producing a case-specific 
version of the ACF. 
Implications for the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
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 This study validated the use of the IAC as a tool for measuring longitudinal 
public opinion behaviors.  By conducting a case study of a radiation detection 
equipment program at DHS DNDO, public issue attention as a factor contributing to 
policy change in conjunction with accrued Congressional policy knowledge is 
traced through the ACF theory of the policy process.  This study indicates that the 
research hypothesis is exhibited in this case:  Radiation detection program budget 
decreases occurred in conjunction with a gradual decline in public attention and 
enhanced Congressional policy-oriented learning. 
 The five phases of the IAC are apparent in the case, and alternate measures 
of public issue attention, including Gallup polling data and Google Trends data also 
confirm the cycle of public attention as Downs describes.  As the data relate to the 
ACF, the exogenous public issue attention factor folded into the policy subsystem 
also exhibits some association in terms of the timing of the major FY 2010 budget 
decision.  Although the association is not exhibited causally, a relationship between 
the decline of public attention and the accrual of Congressional policy knowledge 
occur in conjunction with the major budget decision.   
 The ACF, as described by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (Figure 15): 
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Figure 15: ACF Policy Process 
Next, the ACF is adapted to the events of this case study.  Of note are 
several key events, which, as predicted by the hypotheses of the ACF, influence 
policy change, particularly in 2008.  These events include the frustrating outcome of 
research and development testbeds, negative reporting from the field regarding the 
performance of equipment, declining public attention, and a massive federal budget 
impasse that resulted in a Continuing Resolution.  The depoliticized environment 
that Sabatier describes may be responsible for the bipartisan support of incremental 
policy shift that occurred after the variety of apolitical GAO testimonies and other 
testimonies indicated that the physics problems associated with passive radiation 
detection were not sorting out, in spite of massive research and development 
commitments.   
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Figure 16: The ACF Adapted to this Case Study 
In terms of policy knowledge accrual, this research also indicates that the 
ACF is a suitable theoretical framework for describing the policy change in 
conjunction with public issue attention as an exogenous factor influencing policy 
change. In addition to the behaviors exhibited in public issue attention, I observed, 
over a decade time period, the influence of technical information, as well as the 
manner in which advocacy coalitions and actors affect change beyond the traditional 
bureaucratic iron triangle.  This observation discounts the null hypothesis, which in 
this case, suggests that exogenous factors such as policy technical knowledge 
accrual or public interest do not influence policy change.  Instead, this research 
exhibits confirms the presence and potential influence of factors external to the 
subsystem throughout the policy making process.  In particular, the role of technical 
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information and the transition of public issue attention into the gradual decline of 
interest phase of the IAC emerge as factors potentially catalyzing policy change in 
2008.   
 Another central assertion of ACF, which is the role of belief systems, is also 
clearly imparted by this case study.  This study happens to consider a case in which 
nearly the entirety of the subsystem shares the same core belief that the U.S. should 
utilize resources to defend against nuclear terrorism.  The policy core beliefs of 
subsystem members typically resist change.  Change in policy core beliefs is usually 
in response to “verification and refutation from new experiences and information” 
(Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009, p. 123).  This study supports this observation. 
 Three distinct changes in core policy beliefs are identified.  The first shift in 
policy core beliefs occurred in 2003, then when DHS received its mandate to 
centralize national security matters into one federal department.  At this time, a pro-
detector coalition emerged.  The private sector, academia and scientific 
communities shared secondary core support of radiation detection equipment prior 
to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This periphery appreciation of the value of these 
systems is most evident in consideration of deployments as a part of nuclear safety, 
nonproliferation initiatives with Russia, and law enforcement use of personal 
radiation detectors.  When the systems were presented as a part of a domestic 
nuclear detection and interdiction strategy, coalitions who typically resonated with 
law enforcement-centric policy core beliefs shifted, readily emphasizing the use of 
equipment, rather than intelligence and officers as primary deterrents.  The second 
significant shift occurred in 2005 when DNDO was established.  This shift affected 
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secondary beliefs.  The establishment of DNDO occurred to clarify roles and 
responsibilities regarding research and development and acquisition of equipment 
and resolution of alarms.  The third shift in policy core beliefs resulted in 2008 
when broad consensual support of DNDO degraded, leading to significant 
reductions in its scope of work and budget.  This third significant policy shift 
became central focus of the analytical component of this dissertation, and 
observations of it comprise the bulk of the analyses that follow.  At this time, 
temporary members of the pro-detector coalition returned to their policy core 
beliefs, particularly those which placed emphasis upon the use of human 
intelligence and law enforcement as primary tools for interdictions.   
 Declining public interest, coupled with the substantial advancement of 
policy knowledge observed in 2008 further reflect the hypothesis.  Policy changes 
were made in 2008 and are reflected by the notable FY 2010 budget reductions.  
Negative reporting began its upward trend in 2004, and by 2006, the public 
transitioned into the “Realizing the Cost of Significant Progress” phase of the IAC.  
This phase was dominated by reports of equipment failures and struggles within the 
DNDO organization to define a strategic path forward.  The dearth of positive 
reporting after 2008, along with intensified scrutiny of challenges facing DNDO 
frames a useful reference when considering the additional, more detailed charts that 
follow.  
 The coding process exposes the emergence of policy-oriented learning, and 
reading hearings over time shows how the coalition members became educated 
about the nuclear threat.  Over time, members began to appreciate the challenges 
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associated with nuclear material detection.  Ultimately, the shared deep core 
commitment to domestic security held fast among all members, even as secondary 
policy beliefs emerged.  David A. Baldwin describes policy-relevant knowledge as 
“what policy makers need to know in order to choose among alternative courses of 
action” (Baldwin, 2000).  In this case study, we understand that, in the end, 
Congress decided to greatly reduce the initial scope of radiation detection 
equipment programs at a time when the public’s attention was elsewhere.   
Other Findings 
 
 The chart below is of particular interest because the data it displays reveal an 
observable lag relationship.  Statistically, there is a .89 correlation between the 
frequency of total positive and negative sentiment news stories and the federal 
budget when a 3-year lag is applied.  The data suggest a legislative response to 
public interest in radiation detection equipment programs occurred roughly three 
years after an initial spike in public interest.  Public issue attention peaked at this 
time, and in 2005, more radiation detection equipment news stories were published 
than at any other time during this longitudinal study.  Once DNDO encountered 
Congressional engagement after 2005, legislator accrual of policy technical 
knowledge began to accrue.  For two years thereafter, this accrual of policy 
knowledge regarding equipment capabilities, including reports to legislators 
regarding the challenges of field application, mixed reviews from acquisition tests, 
and higher than expected costs, began to shape out-year fiscal commitments.  After 
2005, positive news stories were replaced with fewer news stories, most of which 
were negative, as indicated in Table 3. 
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Figure 17: News Stories and Budget 
 
Discussion 
 Using this policy change circumstance with distinct technical, political, and 
public interest characteristics, I found indications of policy-oriented learning and 
shifts in coalition policy core beliefs. These characteristics provide an opportunity to 
isolate the impact of public issue attention and policy knowledge upon the 
policymaking subsystem.  Because these characteristics are rather uncommon in 
today’s policymaking environment, these findings may not be readily generalizable 
across issues. However, the methodological approach is generalizable, and similar 
data sets can be drawn to apply the ACF and IAC.  The concepts of policy 
knowledge and public issue attention also warrant thorough definitional exploration 
in future research.  Corroborating the results derived from this methodological 
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approach with cases that share the same features would continue to discern the way 
in which policy knowledge plays an important role in policy change.   
Final Observations and Implications 
	  
 The establishment of DHS was just one product of the new policy core 
beliefs that emerged in the wake of 9/11.  The national tragedy launched domestic 
security the top of the national agenda, coalescing a wide variety of actors around 
the single core belief that the nation’s security was at risk and a major effort to 
develop a unified approach to protecting it was needed.  The product of these beliefs 
is the Department of Homeland Security, established in 2003.  In addition to 
creating a new mission, the scope and tasks of many existing government programs 
were also refined at this time to reflect a domestic mission.  Secondary policy 
beliefs were reflected specific national security positions as defined by various 
coalitions.  Support of the domestic nuclear detection system deployments 
immediately appealed to lawmakers.  By shifting the focus from international to 
domestic deployments, lawmakers could tout one way in which America could 
enhance point of entry security with what they believed to be an existing capability 
that could be enhanced for a national security purpose.  The sense of urgency 
provoked by the 9/11 attacks led to rapid decision-making with regard to the WMD 
threat posed by Al-Qaeda.  Urgency forced a variety of decisions, some of which 
were made with incomplete information.  Over time, it became clear that while 
necessary, some of the early strategic paths, such as the pursuit of the Global 
Nuclear Detection Architecture, required revision.  Concerns leveled against 
detection programs became persistent as technical audits indicated a variety of 
125 
equipment limitations, ambitious plans were replaced by tempered expectations. For 
example, early indicators that the cost of Advanced Spectroscopic Portal 
installations could reach nearly half a million dollars did not provoke detractors.  
However, the practical and technical inefficiencies reported by the Law 
Enforcement and Private Sector Coalitions did alarm lawmakers and gradually 
undermine support. These shifts reflect informed evolution of secondary policy 
beliefs—Congress remained committed to national defense against nuclear 
terrorism, but began to have misgivings about dedicating the majority of resources 
to this area.  Congressional hearings reveal specific concerns with the equipment 
and deployments; legislators responded by requesting audits and analyses of 
radiation detection programs. GAO then testified in conjunction with program 
managers and experts to establish the state of affairs for the various paths forward. 
Despite the resource support, DNDO’s Advanced Spectroscopic Portal monitor and 
passive radiography R&D projects eventually suffered ongoing technical and 
practical challenges. DNDO struggled to proactively respond to GAO criticism of 
the Office’s program management and lack of strategic vision, and in from FY 2010 
to present, DNDO’s budget authorization leveled at approximately $300 million.   
 There are hundreds of thoughtful, articulate, and sometimes frightening 
statements made by members and witnesses in these hearings.  Committee 
Chairmen set the tone for these sessions and even moderate member discussions 
throughout the hearing.  Of the thousands of pages of testimonies I read, two 
statements made by Sen. Lieberman reflect the dilemma our nation faces most 
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dramatically and accurately.  Sen. Lieberman, Senate Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs 2008 “Nuclear Terrorism” hearing: 
The programs administered by DNDO are a mission where failure is, quite 
literally, not an option because the danger of terrorists acquiring a nuclear 
weapon, we know from previous hearings that we have held on this subject, is 
real and present. Between 1993 and 2006 there were 1,080 confirmed incidents 
of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, with 18 of these cases involving 
weapons-grade materials and another 124 involving material capable of making 
a so-called ‘‘dirty bomb’’ that would use conventional explosives to spread 
nuclear material. This is serious stuff. ASP and CAARS were supposed to work 
in tandem, scanning all cargo coming by air, sea, and land for nuclear material. 
ASP was designed to detect unshielded nuclear materials with greater accuracy 
and fewer false alarms than the portal monitors now in use. CAARS was 
designed to complement the ASP system by detecting high-density materials 
that terrorists could use to shield radiation from nuclear materials from ASP 
detection.  
 
These programs looked very promising when announced just a few years ago, 
but it now seems that neither is likely to live up to expectations, which does 
leave our Nation at risk, especially the unprotected areas that lay outside of the 
established land, air, and sea ports of entry. Let me start by saying a little more 
about ASP. According to a tough and disturbing report from the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), that we will hear about this morning, the price of 
ASP has ballooned from an estimated $1.2 billion 2 years ago to as much as 
$3.8 billion today and apparently no less than $3.1 billion. It is also behind 
schedule and, apparently, will not be deployed as aggressively as initially 
planned. For instance, it will not be used to screen rail cars and extra-wide 
trucks, leaving dangerous gaps that can be exploited by terrorists that, 
apparently at this point, DNDO does not know how to fill (Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2008). 
 The nuclear threat poses a real and dangerous threat to the U.S.  However, 
like many of the world’s greatest challenges, even the most passionate political 
support and robust budgets do not always lead to practical solutions.  This study 
indicates that policy knowledge does have an influence upon policy change, 
particularly when the public’s issue attention is directed elsewhere.  This being the 
case, the research further highlights the impact witnesses may have when providing 
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Congressional testimony and promotes the political value of keeping appraised of 
public interest and sentiment regarding issues facing the nation. 
 The manner in which advocacy coalitions coalesced as new scientific 
information emerged regarding the viability of radiation detection equipment, 
coupled with the public’s interest in a nuclear detection solution are determined to 
be important considerations in terms of policy change.   
Future Research 	  
 Interviews of Congressional participants, GAO auditors, and program 
managers would make a rich contribution to this project.  In particular, discovering 
through interviews how hearing participants prepared for testimonies and which 
sources of information they relied upon would provide further insight into policy 
learning.  A survey of participants ranking the value they place upon various sources 
of information may reveal whether participants are more likely to be influenced by 
independent auditors, media, technical journals, or other sources of information.  
This work would facilitate greater understanding of the manner in which knowledge 
is collected and applied in the hearing venues.  Additionally, analysis of the data 
with regard to partisanship would reveal party-line relationships among executive 
branch representatives and their fellow partisans in the legislature.   
 Regarding this particular case, the following observation was unexpected—
reading thousands of pages of hearing in sequential order revealed that many of our 
legislators on both sides of the aisle are deeply committed to seeking the most 
accurate information available to inform their important decisions.  They do follow 
issues and exhibit long-term advancement of knowledge.  Before I embarked upon 
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the research, I suspected that the data gathered in this project would intensify my 
cynicism.  Instead, it encouraged me.  I was pleased to see that it seems like the 
majority of legislators and their staffs come to sessions prepared to learn, prepared 
to provide thoughtful recommendations, and prepared to do their best to represent 
the best interests of the American people.  It is my opinion that much of the 
knowledge accumulated in the 2008 hearings as well as many others was available 
prior to 2008.  The highly technical nature of this issue—as with so many issues of 
national concern—indicates that Members of Congress and their professional 
staffers could benefit from “crash courses” on emerging issues.  This is because 
staffers provide another overlooked stream of knowledge for a Congressperson. 
They are often the first to raise the issue to a member, identifying issues arising 
prior to mainstream political events forcing them onto the Hill.  They provide 
briefing materials, research and advice throughout the legislator’s tenure. 
 Broadly, additional research efforts directed at drawing conclusions about 
the manner in which legislators accumulate policy-oriented knowledge and how the 
public responds to policy changes made as a result of informed decision making is 
essential to understanding of the policy process.  Informed by a proper appreciation 
of the learning process, all members in the policymaking process can endeavor to 
ensure that mistakes are not repeated.  Given these findings, the ACF and IAC are 
substantiated as logical and explicit theoretical approaches that account for the 
importance of including exogenous factors into any analysis of the policy process.   
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APPENDIX ONE 
Organizational Affiliations  
 
Academia, Scientists 
AAAS 
Academia 
Council on Foreign Relations 
DOE 
LANL 
LLNL 
National Academy of Science 
National Laboratory 
NGO 
 
Auditors and Observers 
9/11 Commission 
CRS 
Defense Science Board 
GAO 
National Commission on Terrorism 
State Government 
Voices of 9/11 
 
Law Enforcement 
DHS, Customs 
DHS, Coast Guard 
DOJ 
DTRA 
FBI 
Local Law Enforcement (LEO) 
 
DNDO 
DHS, Leadership 
DHS, DNDO 
DHS, S&T 
Domestic Preparedness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Private Sector 
International Brotherhood 
International Longshoremen 
ODIS 
Port Authority 
Port Authority of New York 
Private Sector 
World Customs Organization 
 
Representatives 
Representatives
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APPENDIX TWO 
Codebook Samples 
Sample from Congressional Hearing Coding Schema 
 
 
Hearing: The Congressional Record number for the particular hearing 
 
Date: Date or dates of Congressional Hearing 
 
Date2: Formatting requirement for statistic runs 
 
Title: Refers to the Title of the Hearing as published in the Congressional Record 
 
Committee: Full name of Committee in either House or Senate 
Witness: Name of the key individual called before the Committee 
Speaker Affiliation: Name of the Department or entity the Witness represents; also 
may include additional descriptive information such as “Leadership” 
Questioner: Always a member of Congress, indicates the examiner of a particular 
witness for a Question and Answer bundle 
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Statement or Q&A: Indicates whether the coded item is a statement or a Question and 
Answer bundle 
Political or Technical: Indicates the theme of the Statement or Q&A bundle 
Positive or Negative: Indicates the coder’s sentiment assignment for the Statement or 
Q&A bundle.  This item is the subjective decision that is made by the primary coder 
and the reliability coder. 
Coalition: Each participant is assigned to any of the six Coalitions.  List of Coalition 
breakout is available in the Appendix, “Coalition Lineup”  
 Columns T, U and Y are not a part of the data set and for reference and organizational 
purposes only. 
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Sample from Newspaper Headline Coding Schema 
 
 
File Number: This is a number assigned to represent a unique article. 
Date: Date news item ran in print 
Source: Name of newspaper 
Headline: Headline  
Byline: Journalist proper name 
Sentiment: Positive or Negative 
General Observation: Used for reference, not a part of analyzed data set.  
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APPENDIX THREE 
Terminology 
	  
 ACF studies are best conducted when they include longitudinal data of a decade 
or more.  In this dissertation, the period of study begins in 2003 and ends in 2013, thus 
providing an adequate timespan for an ACF approach to understanding policy change.   
Subsystems in this study include Representatives and Senators of the U.S. Congress, but 
also government program leadership, academics, private sector employees, and NGO 
spokespeople.  These members’ participation throughout the longitudinal study allows 
the ACF to account for various sources of influence and information upon the policy 
process.  Manifestations of subsystem member participation are seen through the 
progression of scientific knowledge over time.  The knowledge progression influences 
the belief systems of members.   
Policy core beliefs are distinguished by their resistance to change; secondary 
aspects of policy beliefs are more likely to be altered by learning, as evidenced in this 
case study.   
 Policy knowledge is a broad reference to the “political process where people 
compete over the authoritative allocation of values and over the ability to use the 
instruments of government—including coercion—in their behalf” (Easton, 1965) (Lowi, 
1964).  Along with other descriptive detail such as dates and titles, subsystem 
membership and the positive or negative sentiment of exchanges are coded to observe 
the accumulation of policy knowledge.  Charts of the statements, questions and answers 
exchanged over the course of many years among many experts provide the data picture 
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that informs greater understanding of policy learning.  “In a world of scarce resources, 
those who do not learn are at a competitive disadvantage in realizing their goals” 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition 
Approach, 1993).  Coalitions emerge as members of the subsystem solidify and pursue 
their core and policy core beliefs.  As coalitions, they pursue their agendas according to 
these beliefs.    
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APPENDIX FOUR 
Nuclear Smuggling Incidents Involving Weapons Usable Material, 
1992-2001 (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2002) 
 
 
 	  
Date Source Seizure Material/Quantity Discovery 
May-92 Russia Russia 1.5kg HEU Police investigation 
May-93 Russia Lithuania .1kg 50% HEU Police investigation 
Jul-93 Russia Russia 1.8kg 36% HEU Police Investigation 
Nov-93 Russia Russia 4.5kg 20% HEU Police investigation 
Mar-94 Russia Russia 3.05kg 90% HEU Police investigation 
May-94 Unspecified  Germany .006kg PU-239 Police investigation 
Jun-94 Russia Germany .0008kg 87.8% HEU Police investigation 
Jul-94 Russia Germany .00024kg Pu Police investigation 
Aug-94 Russia Germany .4Kg of Pu Police investigation 
Dec-94 Russia Czech 
Republic 
2.7kg 87.7% HEU Police investigation 
Jun-95 Russia Czech 
Republic 
.0004gr 87.7% HEU Police investigation 
Jun-95 Russia Czech 
Republic 
.017kg 21% HEU Police investigation 
Jun-95 Russia Russia 1.7kg 21% HEU Police investigation 
May-99 Russia Bulgaria .004 kg HEU Customs interdiction1 
Oct-99 Unspecified  Kyrgyzstan .0015kg Pu Police investigation 
Apr-00 Unspecified  Georgia .9kg 30% HEU Detection 
equipment/police 
investigation 
Sep-00 Russia or 
Ukraine 
Georgia .004kg Pu Police investigation 
Jan-01 Unspecified  Greece .003kg Pu Police investigation 
Jul-01 Unspecified  France .005kg 80% HEU Police investigation 
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APPENDIX FIVE 
Hearings List 
 
 No. Date Title Committee Witnesses 
1 108-6 
 
 
 
5/20/2003 
& 
5/22/2003 
How is American Safer? A 
Progress Report on the 
DHS 
Select 
Committee on 
Homeland 
Security 
DHS Secretary 
Ridge 
2 108-7 5/21/2003 Homeland Security Science 
and Technology: Preparing 
for the Future 
Select 
Committee on 
Homeland 
Security 
Undersecretary 
for S&T Charles 
McQueary 
3 109-5 3/22/2005 Protecting Our Commerce: 
Port and Waterway 
Security 
Homeland 
Security 
Port Authorities 
4 109-7 4/13/2004 The DHS: Promoting Risk-
Based Prioritization and 
Management 
Homeland 
Security 
DHS Secretary 
Chertoff 
5 109-8 4/14/2005 Grant Reform: The Faster 
and Smarter Funding for 
First Responders 
Homeland 
Security 
First Responders 
6 109-10 4/19/2005 
& 
4/20/2005 
DHS Coordination of 
Nuclear Detection Efforts 
Part I & II 
Homeland 
Security 
NGO’s, DNDO 
Director Oxford 
7 109-17 5/26/05 Building a Nuclear Bomb: 
Identifying Early Indicators 
of Terrorist Activities 
Homeland 
Security 
Assistant 
Secretary 
Albright 
8 109-23 6/21/2005 Detecting Nuclear Weapons 
and Radiological  
Materials: How Effective is 
Available Technology 
Homeland 
Security 
GAO (Aloise); 
DNDO Director 
Oxford 
9 109-26 6/28/2005 Pathways to the Bomb: 
Security of Fissile 
Materials Abroad 
Homeland 
Security 
Assistant 
Secretary 
Albright 
10 109-32 7/14/2005 
& 
7/25/2005 
The Secretary’s Second 
Stage Review: Rethinking 
the DHS’s Organization 
and Policy Direction Part I 
& II 
Homeland 
Security 
DHS Secretary 
Chertoff 
11 109-41 9/22/2005 Trends in Illicit Movement 
of Nuclear Materials 
Homeland 
Security 
Rens Lee; LLNL 
Rep 
12 109-50 10/27/2005 Nuclear Incident Response 
Teams 
Homeland 
Security 
DOE, FBI 
13 109-69 3/16/2006 HR 4954 The Safe Port Act Homeland 
Security 
Asst. Comm. 
CBP Ahern; 
Shipping 
Companies 
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 No. Date Title Committee Witnesses 
14 109-71 4/4/2006 HR 4954 The Safe Port Act Homeland 
Security 
DepSec DHS; 
Shipping 
Companies 
15 109-81 5/25/2006 Enlisting Foreign 
Cooperation in U.S. Efforts 
to Prevent Nuclear 
Smuggling 
Homeland 
Security 
DHS, State, 
DOE, DNDO 
Director Oxford 
16 109-87 6/22/2006 Reducing Nuclear and 
Biological Threats at the 
Source 
Homeland 
Security 
NNSA, State 
17 109-98 9/7/2006 DHS’s Science and 
Technology Directorate: Is 
it Structured for Success? 
Homeland 
Security 
DHS S&T 
18 109-
103 
9/14/2006 The Science of Prevention Homeland 
Security 
Scientists 
19 109-
106 
9/26/2007 The Department of 
Homeland Security Major 
Initiatives 2007 and 
Beyond 
Homeland 
Security 
DHS Secretary 
Chertoff 
20 109-
186 
5/26/2006 The CSI and the CT-PAT: 
Securing the Global Supply 
Chain or Trojan Horse? 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
Affairs 
DHS Sr. Officials 
21 109-
395S 
7/14/2005 U.S. DHS: Second Stage 
Review 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
Affairs 
DHS Secretary 
Chertoff 
22 109-
548S 
3/28/2006 
& 
3/30/2006 
Neutralizing the Nuclear 
and Radiological Threat: 
Securing the Global Supply 
Chain 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
Affairs 
GAO Mr. Aloise; 
DNDO Director 
Oxford 
23 109-
877S 
4/5/06 The Future of Port Security: 
The Greenlane Maritime 
Cargo Security Act 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
Affairs 
DHS Sr. Officials 
24 109-
976S 
9/12/2006 Homeland Security: The 
Next 5 Years 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
Affairs 
DHS Sr. Officials 
25 110-2 2/7/2007 An Overview of Issues and 
Challenges Facing the DHS 
Homeland 
Security 
Inspector General 
26 110-4 2/13/2007 
& 3/8/2007 
Border Security: 
Infrastructure, Technology 
and the Human Element 
Part I of II 
Homeland 
Security 
DHS Sr. Officials 
27 110-14 3/14/2007 Countering the Nuclear 
Threat to the Homeland 
Homeland 
Security 
GAO Mr. Aloise; 
DNDO Director 
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 No. Date Title Committee Witnesses 
Part I of II Oxford 
28 110-31 4/26/2007 The Safe Port Act: A Six 
Month Review 
Homeland 
Security 
GAO; Port 
Authorities 
29 110-50 6/19/2007 Keeping the Border Secure: 
Examining Potential 
Threats Posed by Cross-
Border Trucking 
Homeland 
Security 
Trucking 
Companies 
30 110-67 9/5/2007 Holding the Department of 
Homeland Security 
Accountable for Security 
Gaps 
Homeland 
Security 
DHS Secretary 
Chertoff 
31 110-80 10/20/2007 The Safe Port Act: Status of 
Completion One Year Later 
Homeland 
Security 
GAO; DNDO 
Director Oxford 
32 110-99 3/5/2008 Nuclear Smuggling 
Detection: Recent Tests of 
Advanced Spectroscopic 
Portal Monitors 
Homeland 
Security 
DNDO Director 
Oxford 
33 110-
111 
5/7/2008 Assessing the Resiliency of 
the Nation’s Supply Chain 
Homeland 
Security 
Port Inspectors, 
CBP 
34 110-
118 
5/22/2008 The Border Security 
Challenge: Recent 
Developments and 
Legislative Proposals 
Homeland 
Security 
DHS Sr. Officials 
35 110-
323 
11/15/2007 Not a Matter of “If” but 
“When”: The Status of the 
U.S. Response Following 
an RDD Attack 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
Affairs 
GAO Mr. Aloise 
36 110-
676 
10/16/2007 One Year Later: A Progress 
Report on the Security and 
Accountability for Every 
(SAFE) Port Act 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
Affairs 
 Port Authorities, 
GAO 
37 110-
1038 
2/13/2008 
& 
9/25/2008 
Nuclear Terrorism Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
Affairs 
GAO Mr. Aloise; 
DNDO Director 
Oxford 
38 111-34 9/14/2009 Status Report on Federal 
and Local Efforts to Secure 
Radiological Sources 
Homeland 
Security 
GAO Mr. Aloise 
39 111-40 10/22/2009 Cargo Security at Land 
ports of Entry: Are We 
Meeting the Challenge? 
Homeland 
Security 
DHS Sr. Officials 
40 111-54 3/3/2010 The Department of 
Homeland Security’s 
Science and Technology 
Directorate 
Homeland 
Security 
DHS Sr. Officals 
41 111-
1096 
6/30/2010  
&  
9/15/2010 
Nuclear Terrorism: 
Strengthening Our 
Domestic Defenses 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
GAO Mr. Aloise 
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 No. Date Title Committee Witnesses 
Affairs 
42 111-84 9/30/2010 The Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office: Can it 
Overcome Past Problems 
and Chart a New Direction? 
Homeland 
Security 
DNDO Director 
Stern 
43 112-39 7/15/2011 Homeland Security 
Contracting: Does the 
Department Effectively 
Leverage Emerging 
Technologies? 
Homeland 
Security 
GAO, S&T 
44 112-40 7/26/2011 The Last Line of Defense: 
Federal, State and Local 
Efforts to Prevent Nuclear 
and Radiological Terrorism 
within the United States 
Homeland 
Security 
DNDO Director 
Stern, GAO 
45 112-42 9/8/2011 The Attacks of September 
11: Where are We Today? 
Homeland 
Security 
9/11 Commission 
Members 
46 112-65 2/7/2012 Balancing Maritime 
Security and Trade 
Facilitation: Protecting Our 
Ports, Increasing 
Commerce and Security the 
Supply Chain 
Homeland 
Security 
CBP, GAO 
47 112-84 4/19/2012 DHS and DOE National 
Labs: Finding Efficiencies 
and Optimizing Outputs in 
Homeland Security 
Research and Development 
Homeland 
Security 
DNDO Deputy 
Director 
Gowadia, Labs, 
CRS 
48 112-
110 
7/26/2012 Preventing Nuclear 
Terrorism: Does DHS Have 
an Effective and Efficient 
Nuclear Detection 
Strategy? 
Homeland 
Security 
DNDO Director 
Gowadia, GAO, 
PNNL (Oxford) 
49 113-45 11/19/2013 What Does a Secure 
Maritime Border Look 
Like? 
Homeland 
Security 
Port Inspectors, 
CBP 
BUDGET HEARINGS 
50 109-1 2/10/2005 The Proposed Fiscal Year 
2006 Budget 
Homeland 
Security 
Asst. Secretary 
Albright 
51 109-3 3/2/2005 Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Homeland 
Security 
DHS Sr. Officials 
52 109-8S 3/9/2005 DHS Budget Submission 
for Fiscal Year 2006 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
Affairs 
DHS Secretary 
Chertoff 
53 109-65 2/16/2006 President’s Proposed FY 
2007 Budget for DHS 
Homeland 
Security 
DHS Secretary 
Chertoff 
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 No. Date Title Committee Witnesses 
54 109-
849S 
3/1/2006 DHS Budget Submission 
for Fiscal Year 2007 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
Affairs 
DHS Secretary 
Chertoff 
55 110-3 2/9/2007 An Examination of the 
President’s Fiscal Year 
2008 Budget Request for 
the DHS 
Homeland 
Security 
DHS Secretary 
Chertoff 
56 110-
633 
2/13/2007 Homeland Security 
Department’s Budget 
Submission for 2008 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
Affairs 
DHS Secretary 
Chertoff 
57 110-93 2/13/2008 The President’s FY 2009 
Budget for the DHS 
Homeland 
Security 
DHS Secretary 
Chertoff 
58 110-
996S 
2/14/2008 The Homeland Security 
Department’s Budget 
Submission for FY 2009 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
Affairs 
DHS Secretary 
Chertoff 
59 111-
980 
5/12/2009 The Homeland Security 
Department’s Budget 
Submission for FY 2010 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
Affairs 
DHS Secretary 
Napolitano 
60 111-19 5/13/2009 The President’s FY 2010 
Budget Request for the 
DHS 
Homeland 
Security 
DHS Secretary 
Napolitano 
61 111-22 6/9/2009 FY 2010 Budget for the 
Directorate of S&T for the 
Office of Heath Affairs and 
the DNDO 
Homeland 
Security 
DNDO Director 
Gallaway 
62 111-53 2/25/2010 The President’s FY 2011 
Budget Request for the 
DHS 
Homeland 
Security 
DHS Secretary 
Napolitano 
63 111-54 3/3/2010 The DHS’s Science and 
Technology Directorate 
Homeland 
Security 
US for S&T 
O’Toole 
64 111-
1019S 
2/24/2010 The Homeland Security 
Department’s Budget 
Submission for FY 2011 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
Affairs 
DHS Secretary 
Napolitano 
65 111-
980S 
5/12/2009 The Homeland Security 
Department’s Budget 
Submission for Fiscal Year 
2010 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
Affairs 
DHS Secretary 
Napolitano 
66 112-6 3/3/2011 The President’s FY 2012 
Budget Request for the 
DHS 
Homeland 
Security 
DHS Secretary 
Napolitano 
67 112-
196S 
2/17/11 The Homeland Security 
Department’s Budget 
Submission for FY 2012 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
DHS Secretary 
Napolitano 
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 No. Date Title Committee Witnesses 
Affairs 
68 112-67 2/15/2012 An Examination of the 
President’s FY 2013 
Budget Request for the 
DHS 
Homeland 
Security 
DHS Secretary 
Napolitano 
69 112-
545S 
3/21/2012 The Homeland Security 
Department’s Budget 
Submission for FY 2013 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
Affairs 
DHS Secretary 
Napolitano 
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APPENDIX SIX 
 
GAO Reports Related to Nuclear Detection, 2005-2013 
 
1 2005 Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority of 
Federal Security Directors Is Needed  
2 2006 Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying 
Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns 
Remain  
3 2006 Interagency Contracting: Improved Guidance, Planning, and Oversight 
Would Enable the Department of Homeland Security to Address Risks  
4 2006 Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support 
the Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based 
on Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the 
Monitors' Costs and Benefits  
5 2006 Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at 24/7 
Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies  
6 2007 Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of 
the National Laboratories' Test Results on Radiation Portal Monitors in 
Support of DNDO's Testing and Development Program  
7 2007 Homeland Security: Department-wide Integrated Financial Management 
Systems Remain a Challenge  
8 2007 Homeland Security: DHS's Actions to Recruit and Retain Staff and 
Comply with the Vacancies Reform Act 
9 2007 Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of 
Mission and Management Functions  
10 2008 Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil Support 
Missions May Depend on DOD's Implementation of the 2008 National 
Defense Authorization Act  
11 2008 Homeland Security: First Responders' Ability to Detect and Model 
Hazardous Releases in Urban Areas Is Significantly Limited  
12 2008 Emergency Management: GAO Responses to Post-hearing Questions for 
the Record  
13 2008 Transportation Security: TSA Has Developed a Risk-Based Covert Testing 
Program, but Could Better Mitigate Aviation Security Vulnerabilities 
Identified Through Covert Tests  
14 2008 Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Program to Procure and Deploy 
Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Is Likely to Exceed the 
Department's Previous Cost Estimates  
15 2008 Department of Homeland Security: Improvements Could Further Enhance 
Ability to Acquire Innovative Technologies Using Other Transaction 
Authority  
16 2008 Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Phase 3 Test Report on Advanced 
Portal Monitors Does Not Fully Disclose the Limitations of the Test 
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Results  
17 2008 Department of Homeland Security: Billions Invested in Major Programs 
Lack Appropriate Oversight  
18 2008 Northern Border Security: DHS's Report Could Better Inform Congress by 
Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address 
Vulnerabilities  
19 2008 Homeland Security: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 
Technology Program Planning and Execution Improvements Needed  
20 2009 Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve 
Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities  
21 2009 Nuclear Forensics: Comprehensive Interagency Plan Needed to Address 
Human Capital Issues  
22 2009 Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced 
Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show Limits 
of the New Technology  
23 2009 Equal Employment Opportunity: DHS Has Opportunities to Better 
Identify and Address Barriers to EEO in Its Workforce  
24 2009 Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would 
Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement 
to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers 
25 2009 Department of Homeland Security: Actions Taken Toward Management 
Integration, but a Comprehensive Strategy Is Still Needed 
26 2009 Financial Management Systems: DHS Faces Challenges to Successfully 
Consolidating Its Existing Disparate Systems 
27 2010 Maritime Security: Responses to Questions for the Record 
28 2011 DHS Science and Technology: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure Test 
and Evaluation Requirements Are Met 
29 2011 Federal Protective Service: Progress Made but Improved Schedule and 
Cost Estimate Needed to Complete Transition  
29 2011 Information Technology: DHS Needs to Improve Its Independent 
Acquisition Reviews  
30 2011 Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining 
in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11  
31 2011 Data Mining: DHS Needs to Improve Executive Oversight of Systems 
Supporting Counterterrorism  
32 2011 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: Enhanced Stakeholder 
Consultation and Use of Risk Information Could Strengthen Future 
Reviews 
33 2011 Technology Assessment: Neutron Detectors: Alternatives to Using 
Helium-3  
34 2012 DHS Human Capital: Senior Leadership Vacancy Rates Generally 
Declined, but Components' Rates Vary 
35 2012 Department of Homeland Security: Further Action Needed to Improve 
Management of Special Acquisition Authority  
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36 2012 Department of Homeland Security: Oversight and Coordination of 
Research and Development Should Be Strengthened 
37 2012 Homeland Security: DHS Requires More Disciplined Investment 
Management to Help Meet Mission Needs  
38 2012 Information Technology: DHS Needs to Enhance Management of Cost 
and Schedule for Major Investments 
39 2012 Department of Homeland Security: Efforts to Assess Realignment of Its 
Field Office Structure  
40 2012 Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Megaports Initiative Faces Funding and 
Sustainability Challenges  
41 2013 Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons Learned from Cancelled 
Radiation Portal Monitor Program Could Help Future Acquisitions  
Department of Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Better Evaluate 
and Coordinate Border and Maritime Research and Development  
 
42 2013 DHS Financial Management: Additional Efforts Needed to Resolve 
Deficiencies in Internal Controls and Financial Management Systems  
43 2013 Maritime Security: DHS Could Benefit from Tracking Progress in 
Implementing the Small Vessel Security Strategy 
44 2013 DHS Management and Administration Spending: Reliable Data Could 
Help DHS Better Estimate Resource Requests 
 
